

National Influenza Plan Volume 3: Communications Strategy

Document of the Saint Lucia National Emergency Management Plan Developed by NEMO Secretariat with support from the Pan American Health Organisation and Links Media, Rev October 6, 2008 / October 27, 2008

> Cabinet Conclusion 498/2009 (18 May, 2009) Authorised the National Influenza Plan for Saint Lucia



Preamble

NATIONAL INFLUENZA PLAN

The National Influenza Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan is a collection of documents as listed below.

The procedures are supported by the Saint Lucia National Emergency Management Plans, Policies, Legislation, and Standard Operating Procedures.

Volume

- 0. Policy
- 1. Concept of Operations
- 2. Strategic Plan
- 3. Communications Strategy
- 4. Ministry of Health Plan
- 5. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Plan
- 6. Ministry of Education Plan
- 7. Law Enforcement, Public Safety, and Security
- 8. Essential Services
 - 1. Ministry of the Public Service
 - 2. Saint Lucia Fire Service
 - 3. LUCELEC
 - 4. Digicel
 - 5. LIME
 - 6. WASCO
 - 7. SLASPA

Table of Contents

I.	Communications Strategy	1
	A. Executive Summary	1
	B. Objectives	3
	C. Background and Situation Analysis	4
	D. Methodology and Approach	5
	E. National Avian and Pandemic Influenza Communications Standard Operating Procedures.	7
II.	Sector Communications Strategies and Standard Operating Procedures	. 12
	A. Health	. 13
	B. Education	. 22
	C. Agriculture	. 32
	D. Tourism	. 39
	E. Security	. 46
	F. Food	. 52
	G. Livelihood	60
III.	Plan for Testing, Validating, and Updating the Strategy	
	A. Introduction	
	B. Recommendations to Ensure Full Implementation of the Plan	
	C. Monitoring and Evaluation Guidance	
	D. Future Needs for Training, Technical Assistance, and Budget Analysis	. 67
IV	Annexes and Resources on CD	. 68
	A. Existing and New Government of Saint Lucia Plans and Policies Applicable to Communications	
	B. Pandemic Communicators and Media Contact Lists	
	 Pandenne Communicators and Media Contact Lists 1. Contact Lists for Government Agencies, District Committees, Media Houses, and NEMO Secretariat 	
	2. Avian Influenza Communication Strategy Workshop Participant List	
	3. Saint Lucia Channels of Information	
	C. Crisis Communications Resources	
	1. List of Needs for Mass Communications Effort	
	2. Working with Journalists	
	3. Media Guide to Disease Definitions	
	4. Bird Flu and You Flier	
	 Rapid Appraisal Monitoring Mini-Survey Preapproved Key Messages and Bulletins 	
	E. Bibliography	
	F. CD Contents	
	1. Preexisting Communications Materials and Resources	

- i. Avian Influenza Communications Resources and Web Links
- ii. Bird Flu and You Flier
- 2. Pandemic Communications Checklists
 - i. PAHO Communications Checklists
 - ii. CDC Crisis and Emergency Risk Communications Checklist

CONTRIBUTORS

A. L. Dawn French	Director, National Emergency Management Organisation, Saint Lucia
Susan Hodge	Programme Officer, Department of Disaster Management, Anguilla
Richard D.M. Alfred	Webmaster, Government Information Service, Saint Lucia
Rose Marie Harris	Information Officer, Government Information Service, Saint Lucia
Richmond Felix	Application and Database Developer, Government Information Service, Saint Lucia
Parker Ragnanan	Senior Environmental Health Officer, Ministry of Health, Environmental Health Department
Ann Jean Baptiste	Planning Officer, Ministry of Education, Saint Lucia
Sabina Belizaire	Poultry Scientist, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Saint Lucia
Hinkson Butcher	Information Assistant, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Information Unit, Saint Lucia
Anthony Scotland	Manager, Dominica Solid Waste Management Corporation, Ministry of Health, Dominica
Cyprian Yarde	Information/Communication Officer, Ministry of Health, Bureau of Health Education, Saint Lucia
Kerby Allain	Public Relations Manager, Saint Lucia Tourist Board, Saint Lucia
Robert Lee	Coordinator, Influenza Pandemic Preparedness in the Caribbean, PAHO
Shirley Augustine	Country Programme Officer, Pan American Health Organization, Dominica
Marisabel Sánchez	President and CEO, Links Media, USA
Richard R. Martin	Communications Advisor, Links Media, USA
Carol L. Miller	Communications Advisor, Links Media, USA



I. COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY

A. Executive Summary

This document presents a national strategy for communication activities to be used in Saint Lucia before and during possible outbreaks of avian or pandemic influenza. The Communications Strategy is part of an ongoing joint program of the Government of Saint Lucia, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). It is designed to be a component of the comprehensive National Influenza Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan of the Government of Saint Lucia. Support from USAID and PAHO was provided by their regional programs of support for avian and pandemic influenza preparedness throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.

Since 2003, a growing number of human H5N1 (avian Influenza virus) cases have been reported in Asia, Europe, and Africa. More than half of the people infected with the virus have died. Most of these cases are believed to have been caused by exposure to infected poultry. There has been no sustained human-to-human transmission of the disease, but H5N1 could evolve into a virus capable of human-to-human transmission. Experts fear that when individuals with the human Influenza virus become infected with H5N1, the bird Influenza virus could acquire some genes from the human Influenza virus and, with them, the ability to spread from person to person.

Communication is critical in efforts to slow a developing pandemic. Currently, no vaccine protecting humans against the H5N1 virus strain that has been observed in Asia, Europe, and Africa is commercially available. And, until a new pandemic Influenza virus emerges and is identified, a vaccine specific to that virus strain cannot be developed.

Infected birds can spread the virus for more than a week in their saliva, nasal secretions, and feces. Aside from the normal level of risk any country assumes due to poultry production, imports, and distribution, Saint Lucia is at particular risk of an avian Influenza (AI) outbreak because of the flight patterns of migratory birds and the risk of transmission from nearly 1 million tourists who visit the island each year.

Because of Saint Lucia's economic dependence on tourism and the important role Saint Lucia plays in the Caribbean community, the impact of a poorly communicated outbreak of AI on the island's social, cultural, and economic structure would be devastating to the country and the region.

Saint Lucia's recovery following a pandemic would probably require decades. According to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's July 2007 World Factbook, the official population of Saint Lucia is 170,649; however, the estimated undocumented population brings the total to 200,000. In the Government of Saint Lucia (GOSL) Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan, it is estimated that up to 35 percent of the population—70,000 people of all ages—will become clinically ill, and more than 35,000 will die if an AI pandemic develops on the island.

The impact on individual family incomes and the economic security of the country will be great because, in addition to deaths among wage-earners, fever-related symptoms of Influenza usually last two to five days, and people who survive may take up to two weeks to fully recover. Vulnerable populations include single-parent households whose wage-earners are ill or need to stay home to care for sick family members; people who are young, elderly, poor, or already sick; non-English speakers, and those who have trouble accessing health care under normal circumstances.



Long-term effects on livelihoods could occur, if, for example, workers lose their jobs while out on extended leave. Breakdowns in sectors and infrastructure can create a long-term loss of jobs and income for the country.

Preparing for a pandemic requires all instruments of national power to be leveraged as well as coordinated actions and communications by all segments of government and society. Influenza viruses do not respect distinctions of race, gender, age, profession, or nationality and are not constrained by geographic boundaries.

This makes a pandemic a unique circumstance necessitating a communications strategy that extends well beyond health and medical boundaries to include the maintenance of critical infrastructure, private-sector activities, the movement of goods and services across the nation and the globe, and economic and security considerations. The uncertainties associated with Influenza viruses require a strategy that is versatile enough to ensure that we are prepared for any virus with pandemic potential as well as the annual burden of Influenza.

The Saint Lucia Avian and Pandemic Influenza Communications Strategy and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) is one of eight documents of the National Influenza Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan.

The procedures are supported by the Saint Lucia national emergency management plans, policies, legislation, and SOPs (see Plan and Policies in Annex A).

Goals of the Communications Strategy include strategies and SOPs to:

- stop, slow, or otherwise limit the transmission of the virus strain, thereby decreasing cases, hospitalizations, and deaths and allowing more time for vaccine development;
- promote behaviors that are conducive to limiting the spread of the virus strain in accordance with the principles of surveillance, quarantine, and medical care;
- promote the maintenance of communications necessary for essential services; and
- ensure that facts released nationally and internationally regarding a developing or full pandemic are accurate and immediate and that they mitigate the long-term negative effects on stability and democracy and on the social, cultural, and economic makeup of the country.

Effective, policy-driven communications will also play a critical role in outbreaks requiring public messaging regarding isolation, quarantine, or social distancing.

National and sector communications SOPs for key sectors involved in the response—agriculture, education, health, tourism, livelihood, security, and food—are included in the Communications Strategy. This list of sectors is not exhaustive; others will be added as they are identified.

The Communications Strategy addresses communications activities necessary primarily in Phase 6 of a pandemic, when effective and sustained human-to-human transmission occurs; secondarily, it addresses Phase 4, when evidence of human-to-human transmission is found.

The Strategy is guided by four principles:

- Consistency and integration
- We are all communicators
- Communications outcomes tie directly with desired response outcomes




• Risk and crisis communications are most effective when kept simple

Indicators and a plan for periodic testing, validation, and updating of the Strategy and SOPs are included.

This Strategy, therefore, will define the range of activities that are deemed necessary to (1) prepare communities and responding organizations before a pandemic; (2) ensure the communication of roles and responsibilities to all levels of government, segments of society, and individuals; and (3) support the national response to a pandemic.

Avian & Pandemic Influenza Communications Response Organizational Chart



B. Objectives

The Communications Strategy of the National Influenza Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan guides our communications during preparation and response to an Influenza pandemic with the intent of mitigating the impact of an outbreak of Influenza on the social and economic status of the population. The Strategy will incorporate communications tactics and SOPs to:

- stop, slow, or otherwise limit the transmission of the virus strain, thereby decreasing cases, hospitalizations, and deaths and allowing more time for vaccine development;
- promote behaviors that are conducive to limiting the spread of the virus strain in accordance with the principles of surveillance, quarantine, social distancing, and medical care;
- promote the maintenance of communications necessary for essential services; and



• ensure that facts released nationally and internationally regarding a developing or full pandemic are accurate and immediate and that they mitigate the long-term negative effects on stability and democracy and on the social, cultural, and economic makeup of the country.

The Communications Strategy also supports the guiding policies of the National Influenza Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan.

C. Background and Situation Analysis

Saint Lucia has three main risks of developing an avian Influenza outbreak or a pandemic of avian-to-human transmission, or human-to-human transmission:

- Flight patterns of migratory birds
- Poultry production and distribution
- Likelihood of human-to-human transmission attributable to nearly 1 million tourists visiting Saint Lucia per year

The emergency response system in Saint Lucia is based on a civilian response; in contrast, most Latin American countries rely on a military response. The Communications Strategy is part of the National Influenza Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan, which is supported by the Saint Lucia National Emergency Management Plans, Policies, Legislation, and SOPs.

The Communications Strategy addresses ways to reach general audiences and vulnerable audiences, such as pregnant women, people with chronic illnesses, people who do not read English and tourists who are unaware of emergency response plans. Language barriers among Saint Lucia residents are also addressed. In particular, although English is the official language of the island, some people continue to use the traditional spoken Creole language, and some tourists arriving from non-English-speaking countries will need translated information.

Saint Lucia's two main sources of income are tourism and agriculture. Having a well-structured, fully tested pandemic communications strategy and SOPs ahead of a crisis is important not only to minimize deaths, illnesses, and impacts on people's lives, but also to lessen the economic impact that AI, or the perceived risk of AI, might have on the island's tourism industry and long-term financial stability.

Tourism also could facilitate the spread of pandemic Influenza during incubation periods when an infection has not yet been detected and passengers either arrive in Saint Lucia or board out-bound ships and airplanes where groups of people could become infected and carry the illness back to their home countries.

Limited surveys indicate a lack of public knowledge about the risk of AI in Saint Lucia; this indicates that the risk has not been adequately communicated. Thus, most residents probably do not avoid risky behaviors and do not use preventive measures.

Although this Communications Strategy focuses on the latter phases of a pandemic, GOSL currently plans to use behavior change and risk communications strategies to educate the public and health care workers about the risks, symptoms, and recommended individual actions necessary to contain the spread of Influenza as well as the role they play in reducing the risk of a pandemic.



Currently, no vaccine protecting humans against the H5N1 virus strain that has been observed in Asia, Europe, and Africa is commercially available. And, until a new pandemic Influenza virus emerges and is identified, a vaccine specific to that virus strain cannot be developed.

Laboratory studies suggest that some of the prescription medications approved in some countries for human Influenza viruses should be effective in treating AI infection in humans. However, Influenza viruses can become resistant to these drugs, so these medications may not always work. Additional studies are needed to demonstrate the effectiveness of such drugs. The H5N1 virus that has caused human illness and death in Asia is resistant to amantadine and rimantadine, two antiviral medications commonly used for Influenza. Two other antiviral medications, oseltamavir and zanamavir, would probably work to treat Influenza caused by the H5N1 virus, but additional studies still need to be done to demonstrate their effectiveness.

D. Methodology and Approach

The Communications Strategy is an integral component of a broad National Influenza Preparedness Plan that includes: (1) policies, (2) a national strategic plan, and (3) sector plans from the Ministry of Health; Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry; Ministry of Education; and Law Enforcement, Public Safety, and Security. The Strategy addressed in this document is cross-cutting, supporting all of the national and sector-specific plans. Representatives of the Ministries of Agriculture, Health, Education, and Tourism, along with the Government Information Service (GIS) (see list, Annex B), analyzed requirements, international best practices, institutions, SOPs, interventions, and resource requirements to conduct a full-scale pandemic communications operation. The Strategy and SOPs, now specify

- Public and private partner institutions
- Communications channels and media contacts
- Chain of command in a pandemic emergency

Pandemic Phases

The chart below, derived from the World Health Organization's Global Influenza Preparedness Plan, illustrates the six phases of a pandemic. The world is in Phase 3 as of this writing. This Communications Strategy and the SOPs address primarily the communications necessary for a Phase 6 pandemic; secondarily, it addresses the communications necessary for a Phase 4 pandemic.

Inter-pandemic phase	Low risk of human cases	1
New virus in animals, no human cases	Higher risk of human cases	2
Pandemic alert	No or very limited human-to-human transmission	3
New virus causes human cases	Evidence of increased human-to-human transmission	4
	Evidence of significant human-to-human transmission	5
Pandemic	Efficient and sustained human-to-human transmission	6

Areas of Focus

The Communications Strategy uses three types of communication: (1) behavior change communication, (2) risk communication, and (3) crisis communication. Best practices for communicating before, during, and after



an Influenza pandemic are drawn mainly from evidence-based standards set by the Pan American Health Organization (see bibliography in Annex E).

The Strategy primarily deals with infected humans, but does not exclude animal transmission and its consequences. It focuses on a set of seven critical sectors, for which SOPs have been provided: agriculture, health, tourism, education, security, livelihoods, and food. Additional sectors and situations should be added by the Saint Lucia Pandemic Influenza Communications Committee as they are identified.

Key Principles

This Strategy is driven by four key principles:

- Effective response communications require that all responding organizations be consistent and integrated.
- Although only official spokespersons are authorized to speak with the media, we are all communicators. Everyone in an official response capacity has the responsibility to "think communications," internally and externally. The success of the response is dependent as much on public perception and cooperation as it is on the operational response.
- All communication supports the goals of the National Influenza Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan. Communications outcomes are tied directly to desired response outcomes.
- We will use global risk communications best practices. Risk and crisis communications are best when kept simple. We will analyze our audience, define our outcomes, and deliver short, simple, key messages to ensure that they are easily understood by audiences that may process information in diverse ways during a crisis.

Although every disaster is different, and one could imagine countless scenarios in which an Influenza pandemic could occur, we can predict the types of questions the public will have and the types of behaviors likely to occur. For example:

- During disasters where food and water supplies could potentially run out, people often hoard supplies, which in turn creates unnecessary shortages for other community members.
- When employees or students—or their family members—are ill, work attendance and school attendance drops.
- When work attendance drops by what is predicted to be 35 percent in a pandemic, many roles critical to the functioning of society may not be performed, therefore exacerbating the crisis if, for example, ports are closed where food and fuel normally arrive.
- People may not think clearly and, in an effort to provide for their families, they may congregate to gather information or shop for food, further exposing themselves to risk.

People will want to know what their government response leaders know:

- How to best protect oneself and one's families, animals, and neighbors from exposure to AI
- How to care for infected family members
- How individuals can participate in solving problems presented by the pandemic
- How donated and government dollars are being spent

(Adapted from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's document, Crisis and Emergency Risk Communications by Leaders for Leaders; see Bibliography in Annex E.)

To achieve our communications goals, we will do the following:

• Understand our audiences by identifying predictable behaviors and information needs in a pandemic and the needs of each audience.



- Develop and test messages to meet the needs of all audiences.
- Use global best practices for health crisis and pandemic communications—this includes being first, accurate, transparent, and credible. We will communicate with local, national, regional, and international audiences.
- Integrate communications across all response functions with all partners and bring our audiences along as we resolve problems caused by a pandemic. We will develop and maintain relationships and an open, two-way flow of information with media; local, national, and international partner communicators; and public opinion leaders.
- Invest in new media and other resources and staff required for an effective communications response.
- Build contingencies into our Strategy and SOPs in the event that key communicators become ill or die, or in the event that some communications channels and networks normally used become disabled because of worker absenteeism or overburdened systems.
- Periodically test, validate, and update our Communications Strategy.

Testing the Strategy

At the working meetings in Saint Lucia July 15–17, 2008, the National Pandemic Influenza Communications Committee prioritized these four areas for testing the Strategy during the following 14 to 16 months:

- Testing Saint Lucia health providers
- Testing interagency communications
- Testing regional communications
- Including media in planning and testing plans

The Pandemic Influenza Communications Planning Committee will identify dates and budgets for each test they need to perform and will indicate those for which they need Links Media's support. Tests, drills, and trainings can be multidisciplinary and cross-functional, or specific to testing particular skills or parts of the Communications Strategy and SOPs. Communications tests can be incorporated into other functional tests/drills or full-scale drills.

E. National Avian and Pandemic Influenza Communications Standard Operating Procedures

This section and section 5 include a set of broad, overarching communications SOPs for communications at the national level and subsequent communications SOPs specific to critical sectors in pandemic response. A list of staff, materials, and resources necessary to carry out the functions outlined in the SOPs are found in Annex C.1.

The physical location of the National Media Centre (NMC; also referred to in the National Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan as the Joint Information Center, or JIC) will be dependent on whether it is partially or fully activated. Full activation implies that the incident is severe. In the case of a full activation, the NMC will be located at the GIS Studio. This facility will be able to house at least eight communications representatives at any one time. In the case of partial activation, the GIS officers will disseminate information out of the National Emergency Operations Centre.

Should the location of the NMC change due to the nature of the event, the director of Information Services shall indicate to media houses the new location of the NMC.



In Saint Lucia, the National Emergency Management Organisation (NEMO) Secretariat is the implementing organization responsible for ensuring that the SOPs are followed.

National Communications Standard Operating Procedures

- 1. Communications Functions
 - a. Compile and interpret information for dissemination about the overall scope of the outbreak and response, ensuring that information originating from each involved ministry and operational partner is well coordinated and appropriately represented.
 - b. Instruct the public about measures they should take to protect themselves and their families, animals, and neighbors.
 - c. Inform the public and decision-makers about the nature of the pandemic and its effect on Saint Lucia, using technical expertise and guidance from involved ministries.
 - d. Inform partners and the GOSL leadership about the impact of AI on the overall functioning of Saint Lucia society, including the population, health and medical infrastructure, agriculture, economy, tourism, security, schools, and livelihoods.
 - e. Educate the public concerning behaviors that may protect against AI with support from involved ministries, such as the Ministry of Health Bureau of Education and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry.
- 2. Audiences
 - a. The public and media in Saint Lucia.
 - b. Internal audiences involved in the response, such as operational partners and institutions, including NEMO and NEMO Secretariat staff; the Ministry of Health and its Bureau of Health Education; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry; Ministry of Tourism; the Saint Lucia Tourist Board; local municipalities; private industry and businesses; and nongovernmental, voluntary, and faith-based organizations.
 - c. External audiences, such as the tourism industries, trading partners, the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA); the Caribbean Epidemiology Center (CAREC); Pan American Health Organization (PAHO); the United States Agency for International Development (USAID); neighboring countries; and international media.
- 3. Communications Decision-Makers and Spokespersons
 - a. NEMO is the authorized institution to enact the National Influenza Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan and Communications Strategy.
 - b. Individuals who will approve the timing, content, and distribution of communications during a pandemic include the Director of NEMO in consultation with the Permanent Secretary of Health and the National Influenza Pandemic Communication Committee.
 - c. Spokespersons will include the Director of NEMO, the decision-makers of the key responding ministries, and the GIS information officer, depending on the circumstances.
 - d. GIS staff consults with communicators from ministries and other institutions directly involved, ensuring coordination and accuracy of information released and ensuring that messages are disseminated by an authorized spokesperson for the particular outbreak.
 - e. When the response is deactivating, the Director of NEMO will indicate when the Ministry of Health information office will reassume its role and transition with the GIS information office to become the primary source of pandemic information for the public, the media, and other audiences.



4. Channels

- a. NEMO communicates internally using e-mail, fax, internet, memos, meetings, telephone, and mail.
- b. Public channels of communication include area residents; community meetings; newspaper articles and advertisements; radio and TV news and talk shows (see Annex B.4 for media list); films, videos, and other materials at libraries; the Internet; direct mailings; text messaging*; elected officials; opinion leaders and activists; interagency and interministry communications; frequent telephone calls; fact sheets; personal visits; advance notices; and business associations and ancillary services (e.g., small business association, hotel association, and taxi drivers' association)
- c. For crisis communication, NEMO will have the support of GIS to issue press releases and call press conferences using the national, local, and international news media.

* An agreement with Cable and Wireless is in process September, 2008

- 5. Resources
 - a. Prior to and during a pandemic, NEMO, with the support of GIS, will ensure that printed materials are provided to the ministries responsible for stocking and posting information regarding meeting facilities, vehicles, and field staff for communications purposes.
 - b. Mass media production and access, if needed, will be provided by GIS.
 - c. Refer to Annex C.1 for a complete list of staff, resources, technology, and equipment necessary for a full-scale health emergency communications operation.
 - d. NEMO will designate a semi-annual inventory of all necessary communications resources and will assist operational partners in obtaining resources needed.

6. Roles and Responsibilities

- a. Following the reporting or confirmation of a case of bird-to-human, or human-to-human infection with AI (Phase 4), the NEMO Secretariat may activate the Government of Saint Lucia Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan and its corresponding Communications Strategy.
- b. The decision to activate the JIC, where communicators from involved sectors work together to disseminate information from one central location, will be made by the Director of NEMO, and the JIC will be located at the GIS studio on the Castries downtown waterfront.
- c. The ministries' and other operating organizations' communications responses will follow procedures established in the Government of Saint Lucia Avian Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan.
- d. The NEMO Secretariat will coordinate the flow of information between Government ministries and agencies, ensuring consistency, accuracy, and timeliness and ensuring that all audiences are reached, with special consideration for vulnerable populations. The communication responsibilities of different ministries and sectors are shown in Section II. The NEMO Secretariat will initiate and facilitate emergency briefings or meetings of all institutions and partners directly involved in the response, and develop and disseminate the schedule for future update meetings. A GIS writer or web content manager and an information officer will attend to gather a complete set of information for written and verbal communications regarding the pandemic.
- e. Although the Permanent Secretary Health is normally the final authority for approving the content and timing of communication to the public, if the National Influenza Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan has been activated, this message will be jointly authorized by the Director of NEMO and the Lead Agency -. Public spokespersons may be the Director of NEMO or GIS staff if authorized by the NEMO Director. For communications dealing with



particular sector situations (education, agriculture, food, security, tourism, or livelihood), additional spokespersons from other ministries may be designated (see Sector SOPs) with the approval of the JIC.

- f. Mass media support, if needed, will be provided by GIS.
- g. GIS will craft the first message, in coordination with technical specialists and/or communicators from the ministries involved. The message will then be approved by the Director of NEMO before GIS disseminates it. This step may take place before an interagency meeting if sufficient information is available prior to the meeting.
- h. The NEMO Secretariat will coordinate the efforts of the ministries with responsibility for educating their stakeholders and constituents about a possible AI pandemic, including the nature of the disease, its transmission, and preventive behaviors.
- i. GIS will support NEMO in continuously monitoring news and information released to the public, and correcting misinformation or rumors when appropriate.
- j. NEMO will promptly take actions to contain the spread of avian Influenza and will communicate these actions immediately to the public, policymakers, partners in the response, and regional and international partners.
- k. NEMO will coordinate and track communications training of its staff and all organizations involved in Saint Lucia's Influenza Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan to ensure adequate levels of proficiency and understanding of the Communications Strategy and SOPs.
- 1. The NEMO Secretariat, supported by GIS, will monitor AI-related knowledge, attitudes, and practices and will track the media coverage and the impact of messages so that they can be optimized.
- m. The NEMO Secretariat will contact CDERA, USAID, and other responding regional agencies and neighboring countries to update them regarding the situation and the response. This will be done via phone, fax, and e-mail. (The Ministry of Health will contact PAHO and CAREC while Ministry of Agriculture will contact OIE)
- n. The Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry will collect and communicate up-to-date scientific information on the evolution of the disease in Saint Lucia for possible release to the public in coordination with NEMO Secretariat.
- o. Medical staff of the Ministry of Health will be the first and best source of information on AI for the public, both before and during a pandemic.
- p. The media will be a secondary but important and immediate source of information for the public. Therefore, the Principal Information Officer at GIS and the Director of NEMO will coordinate the first release of information to the public in the form of a written press release or statement and possibly a press briefing or teleconference where reporters have access to experts who are prepared for potential media inquiries and can answer additional questions that may be scientific or medical in nature. An approved spokesperson and/or technical expert from affected ministries and participating response institutions is usually present during a press briefing to help answer technical or scientific questions.
- q. NEMO's internal and external response partners should all receive the press announcements through a mass message dissemination system developed by GIS and NEMO to ensure all are included and have the information before or at the same time as the media.
- r. Updates will be given to audiences by NEMO Secretariat or GIS regularly as it becomes available with regard to new developments or verification of information of immediate importance to the public.
- s. The NEMO Secretariat will gather information from responding ministries and determine when to stand down the response operation, while staying on alert for reoccurring waves of the pandemic.



t. Within two weeks of the culmination of a Phase 4 or higher Influenza emergency, the NEMO Secretariat will coordinate a review with all key players involved in communications and the National Pandemic Communications Committee; issue a report identifying what went well and why and what could be improved and why; and the Communications Committee will incorporate lessons learned into a revised Communications Strategy and Communications SOP



II. SECTOR COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGIES AND STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

This section of the Strategy identifies a series of sector-specific SOPs for communications during a Phase 4 or Phase 6 pandemic. The list of sectors and situations is not exhaustive. It represents the most prominent dangers of which sector specialists on the National Pandemic Communications Committee are aware: agriculture, education, health, tourism, livelihood, security, and food.

Each of the seven sector packages presented here is designed to be a separate, standalone document for use by the individuals and units responsible for a single sector. The sector-specific packages all contain the following information:

- SOPs for the sector.
- Tables with lists of sector-specific Influenza situations that could require a communications response with operational instructions for the response.
- A flow chart showing how different circumstances could require different actions; each flow chart illustrates one particular contingency.

These sector packages will periodically be revised and expanded in the course of testing, validating, and updating the national Communications Strategy (see Section C, below).



A. Health Sector Communications Standard Operating Procedures: Avian and Pandemic Influenza Communication in Saint Lucia

LEAD AGENCY: MINISTRY OF HEALTH

Introduction

In the event of an avian influenza (AI) pandemic, the Ministry of Health (MOH) will have responsibility for surveillance, analysis, prevention, containment, and treatment. With regard to communication, the MOH will provide continuous, accurate, understandable, and practical information about the outbreak to all important national institutions and to the population.

How to Use the Health Sector AI Strategy

This document summarizes avian and pandemic flu communications requirements in Saint Lucia's health sector. The document contains three sections:

1. Health Sector Standard Operating Procedures (Page 14)

Section 1 explains how the health sector will prepare for and respond to an outbreak of avian or pandemic influenza in Saint Lucia. It provides operational guidelines for the following:

- The *functions* that communication will perform in an outbreak
- The *audiences* to whom communication will be directed
- The *decision-makers and spokespersons* who will manage and implement communication
- Communications channels
- The *resources* that will be required for preparation and response
- The *roles and responsibilities* of individuals and organizations in the event of an outbreak
- 2. Health Sector Pandemic Situations and Communications Responses (Page 16)

An outbreak can present multiple communications challenges to the health sector in Saint Lucia. Section 2 presents some specific situations that could occur, along with detailed guidance on how to prepare for or respond to them with effective communication. As Saint Lucia's health sector periodically reviews, updates, and practices the Communications Strategy, new situations should be added to Section 2. For each situation, Section 2 identifies:

- The *objective* that communication should accomplish
- The specific *audience*_affected by the situation
- The pandemic *phase* in which the situation could arise
- The *communications approach* (risk, crisis, or behavior change communications)
- The *institution* responsible for communications
- The *individual* responsible for managing, overseeing, and approving communications
- The *spokesperson* who actually communicates with the public or the media
- The *communications channels* that will be used
- The *timing* of messages
- The *resources* required for communications interventions
- How communications will be *monitored* for effectiveness



3. Health Sector Case Study Flow Chart (Page 21)

Planning for emergencies requires anticipating different contingencies. Flow charts can be useful tools for planning and implementing communications interventions when different possible events need to be anticipated. Section 3 presents a flow chart illustrating how the health sector in Saint Lucia would work its way through one set of circumstances associated with an AI outbreak. Developing flow charts such as the one in Section 3 ensures that a communications intervention will be the best possible response in a rapidly changing and unfamiliar environment.

Section 1: Health Sector Standard Operating Procedures

- 1. Communications Functions
 - a. Phase 4
 - i. Inform MOH staff and private health providers about AI and health implications of different outbreak scenarios.
 - ii. Inform health system clients and the public about AI and the possibility of an outbreak in Saint Lucia.
 - iii. Inform national communications media about AI and their role in the event of an outbreak.
 - iv. Prepare messages and prototype communications materials for use in a future outbreak.
 - b. Phase 6
 - i. Gather, interpret, and report surveillance data for real-time dissemination to the public and to decision-makers.
 - ii. Inform and train health workers to provide preventive information and curative services to the population.
 - iii. Inform the public and the news media in detail about the outbreak. Explain transmission, personal protection, social distancing, hygiene, and other measures people should be prepared to take.
 - iv. Inform international organizations, regional organizations, Government of Saint Lucia ministries, local governments, and private partners about conditions in Saint Lucia.
 - v. Communicate directly with highly vulnerable individuals and groups about risks, precautions, and treatment.
- 2. Audiences
 - a. Internal audiences include government and private health providers, the Minister of Health, the Chief Medical Officer, and national and local health administrators.
 - b. External audiences include the mass media and reporters, the general public, the executive and legislative branches of the government, nongovernmental organizations, business organizations and companies, undertakers, unions, insurance, Port Authority and transportation managers, financial institutions, and security organizations. Individuals who are ill and those who are most vulnerable to exposure constitute a crucial audience.
- 3. Communications Decision-Makers and Spokespersons
 - a. MOH officials who will determine the timing, content, and distribution of communications during a pandemic include the Minister of Health, the Permanent Secretary, and the Chief Medical Officer.
 - b. Spokespersons will include the above decision-makers as well as the MOH's Information Officer and Director of Epidemiology and the Director of the National Emergency Management Organisation (NEMO), depending on the circumstances.



- 4. Channels
 - a. A principal channel for health communication in Saint Lucia is direct contact with patients and the public by MOH health providers.
 - b. Public communication will make use of mass media, town criers, posters and billboards, TV talk shows, and interpersonal communication.

5. Resources

- a. Prior to and during a pandemic, the MOH will require extensive printed materials, access to public meeting facilities, loudspeakers, and vehicles.
- b. Mass media production and access will be provided by the Government Information Service (GIS).

6. Roles and Responsibilities

- a. Health sector communications responses will follow procedures established in the Government of Saint Lucia Avian Influenza Preparedness Plan.
- b. NEMO will coordinate the flow of information between the MOH and other government ministries and agencies, assuring consistency, accuracy, and timeliness.
- c. The Minister of Health is normally the final authority for approving the content and timing of communications to the public. This authority may be delegated by the Minister to the Permanent Secretary, the Chief Medical Officer, or the Information Officer.
- d. Public spokespersons may include the Minister, Permanent Secretary, Chief Medical Officer, Director of Epidemiology, and/or the Information Officer.
- e. Mass media support will be mobilized and supported by the GIS.
- f. The MOH is responsible for the timely and accurate reporting of epidemiological data. The network of health personnel and facilities throughout the country will be trained and equipped for efficient detection and reporting of all pertinent information about an outbreak needed by communicators and decision-makers.
- g. In conjunction with the Ministry of Tourism, the MOH will communicate with tourist facilities cruise ships, hotels, restaurants, and stores—with timely and accurate information of special concern to visitors and to employees of the tourist facilities.
- h. The MOH will provide training for its health providers and administrative and support staff in preparation for an avian influenza pandemic. Training will include simulations of actual pandemic conditions.
- i. The MOH will be the national contact point for information about avian influenza. The MOH will collect and communicate up-to-date scientific information on the evolution of the disease and the threat to Saint Lucia.
- j. MOH medical staff will be the first and best source of information on avian influenza for the public, both before and during a pandemic. Medical staff should be trained in effective risk and crisis communication, and should have access to effective instructional materials.

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
1	Health care workers have limited awareness of avian influenza (prior to evidence of human-to-human cases).	To provide training in avian influenza to health care workers so that they may impart this knowledge to rest of the population.	Information on the etiology of the disease. Information regarding how health care workers can protect themselves (best practices). Information on operations in	Medical and support staff at hospital, SMOs, DMOs, nurses, health educators, etc.	4	Risk Communication	Ministry of Health (Chief Medical Officer's Office)
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	the field. CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
1	Chief Medical Officer, Permanent Secretary	Information Officer, Permanent Secretary	Mass media, mail, meetings, workshops, seminars, literature distribution	2009	Experts, printed materials, training room	Technical interviews with a sample of health providers	

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
2	Public has limited knowledge about avian influenza (prior to evidence of human-to-human cases).	To heighten public awareness of avian influenza issues. To introduce information on emerging diseases into the school health curriculum.	General information on avian influenza. Knowledge of the new disease in addition to traditional diseases listed on the curriculum.	Schools, media, nongovernmental organizations, community-based organizations, public sector workers (police and customs officials) Ministry of Education officials	4	Risk Communication	Ministry of Health (Bureau of Health Education)
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
2	Director	Information Officer	Mass media, town crier, faith- based organizations, community-based organizations, interpersonal contacts, seminars, town hall meetings	2009	Experts, printed materials, training room, equipment	Mini-survey of public	

ID —	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
3	Economic impact of the disease not well known (prior to evidence of human-to-human cases).	To apprise significant members of the commercial and social sectors of the potential impact of the disease.	Information on the disease's potential impact on the social and economic agenda.	Cabinet of Ministers, private sector organizations, trade unions, employers' federations, insurance councils, financial institutions	4	Risk Communication	Ministry of Health
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
3	Permanent Secretary, Chief Medical Officer	Chief Medical Officer	Mass media, mail, interpersonal contacts, sensitization seminars, presentations, meetings with target group	2008	Experts, printed materials, training room, equipment	Feedback following information sessions	

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
4	Limited capacity of health workers and system to deliver health care services in times of crisis.	To develop the ability to mobilize response teams.	Team building and networking at the community level.	Medical and support staff at hospital; SMOs, DMOs, nurses, etc.	4-6	Behavior Change Communication	Ministry of Health
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
4	Minister of Health	National Epidemiologist	Mail, publications, development and circulation of protocols for managing infectious diseases, meetings, simulations	2009	Development, reproduction, and distribution of print materials; training events	Observe response effectiveness in simulations	

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
5	Inadequacy of supplies (PPE, vaccines).	To maintain contacts so that the orders can be fast-tracked.	Ensure that timely and adequate supplies are available.	Administrators, medical suppliers, MOH	6	Risk Communication	Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
5	Chief Medical Officer (MOH), Chief Veterinary Officer (MOAFF)		Dialogue with major hospitals and medical supplies units	Ongoing	Meetings	Simulations	


ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
6	Lack of procedures for minimizing transmission risk and enabling isolation of infected individuals in public transportation.	To sensitize this audience to the high risk of cross-infection.	Provide instruction on signs and symptoms of avian influenza. Actions to be taken if a passenger exhibits signs of avian influenza. Self-protection methods.	Air and Sea Port Authority, Public Transport	6	Risk Communication	Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
6	Chief Medical Officer (MOH), Chief Veterinary Officer (MOAFF)		Meetings with major players in the transportation sector, SLASPA	Ongoing	Print materials; meetings	Feedback from transport managers	

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
7	Limited knowledge of the importance of hygiene and social distancing on the part of organizers of mass gatherings.	To promote aspects of hygiene and adherence to public health requirements.	How hygiene influences accepted behavior and client satisfaction. Concepts of social distancing.	Event promoters/organizers, faith-based organizations	4-6	Risk Communication	National Emergency Management Organisation
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
7	Director	Director	Mail, mass media, meetings, protocols circulated; sensitization of target audiences on the use of protective equipment	2009	Print materials	Feedback from event organizers	

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
8	Inadequate preparation for the disposal of human remains in crisis situations.	To clarify procedures for disposing of remains in a crisis situation.	Procedures for disposing of remains.	Undertakers, the public	6	Crisis communication	Ministry of Health
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
8	Chief Medical Officer	Information Officer (MOH)	Meeting with undertakers and church leaders; Public service announcements on radio and TV; printed instructional materials to all health providers	Immediately if numerous fatalities are reported	Media spots with Government Information Service coordination	Reports of health providers following up fatalities	

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
9	Special needs of vulnerable and susceptible populations poorly understood by patients and health providers during outbreak.	Improve treatment and prevention among especially susceptible individuals under stressful situations.	How to best protect oneself and manage conditions or chronic diseases in an influenza crisis.	Patients with asthma, chronic diseases, respiratory disorders; pregnant and lactating women; and the elderly	6	Crisis communication	Ministry of Health
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
9	Chief Medical Officer	Information Officer (MOH)	Interpersonal via health providers; radio and TV announcements; Develop guidelines for disease management and make these available to families of susceptible groups	As soon as multiple human cases are reported	Emergency short in-service training for health providers	Complaints from patients and family members	

Section 3: Health Sector Case Study Flow Chart



National Influenza Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan



B. Education Sector Standard Operating Procedures: Avian and Pandemic Influenza Communication in Saint Lucia

LEAD AGENCY: MINISTRY OF EDUCATION

Introduction

In the event of an avian influenza (AI) pandemic, the Ministry of Education (MOE) will be responsible for informing the large number of teachers, students, and parents. Schools are a potential focus of transmission. They are also a potential source of positive information and behavior change that can prevent transmission and contain the spread of a pandemic in the school-age population.

How To Use the Education Sector AI Strategy

This document summarizes avian and pandemic flu communications requirements in Saint Lucia's education sector. The document contains three sections:

1. Education Sector Standard Operating Procedures (Page 23)

Section 1 explains how the education sector will prepare for and respond to an outbreak of avian or pandemic influenza in Saint Lucia. It provides operational guidelines for the following:

- The *functions* that communication will perform in an outbreak
- The *audiences* to whom communication will be directed
- The *decision-makers and spokespersons* who will manage and implement communication
- Communications channels
- The *resources* that will be required for preparation and response
- The *roles and responsibilities* of individuals and organizations in the event of an outbreak
- 2. Education Sector Pandemic Situations and Communications Responses (Page 25)

An outbreak can present multiple communications challenges to the education sector in Saint Lucia. Section 2 presents some specific situations that could occur, along with detailed guidance on how to prepare for or respond to them with effective communication. As Saint Lucia's education sector periodically reviews, updates, and practices the Communications Strategy, new situations should be added to Section 2. For each situation, Section 2 identifies:

- The *objective* that communication should accomplish
- The specific *audience* affected by the situation
- The pandemic *phase* in which the situation could arise
- The *communications approach* (risk, crisis, or behavior change communications)
- The *institution* responsible for communication
- The *individual* responsible for managing, overseeing, and approving communications
- The *spokesperson* who actually communicates with the public or the media
- The *communications channels* that will be used
- The *timing* of messages
- The *resources* required for communications interventions
- How communication will be *monitored* for effectiveness



3. Education Sector Case Study Flow Chart (Page 31)

Planning for emergencies requires anticipating different contingencies. Flow charts can be useful tools for planning and implementing communications interventions when different possible events need to be anticipated. Section 3 presents a flow chart illustrating how the education sector in Saint Lucia would work its way through one set of circumstances associated with an AI outbreak. Making flow charts such as the one in Section 3 ensures that a communications intervention will be the best possible response in a rapidly changing and unfamiliar environment.

Section 1: Education Sector Standard Operating Procedures

- 1. Communications Functions
 - a. Phase 4
 - i. Inform MOE staff at all levels about AI and the pandemic threat, the risks of transmission in schools, and procedures that will be used in the school system in the event of an outbreak.
 - ii. Inform students and parents about AI and the pandemic threat, including protective behaviors to use in the event of an outbreak.
 - b. Phase 6
 - i. Maintain the flow of information to all MOE staff about the characteristics of the outbreak, cases in schoolchildren, risk of transmission to school staff, personal protection measures to take, prevention of transmission in the classroom environment, and preparations to close schools if necessary.
 - ii. Maintain flow of information to students and parents about risk of transmission in school, social distancing of children diagnosed, personal protection measures to take in the family, and MOE preparations to protect students.
 - iii. If schools close, advise all MOE staff, students, and parents. After closing, maintain the flow of information about the eventual reopening.
- 2. Audiences
 - a. Internal audiences include MOE central and district administrative staff, school principals, teachers and Students.
 - b. External audiences include parents and managers of denominational schools. Private schools also depend on the MOE for communication and guidance in emergencies.
- 3. Communications Decision-Makers and Spokespersons
 - a. MOE officials who will determine the timing, content, and distribution of communications during a pandemic include the Minister of Education, the Permanent Secretary, and the Chief Education Officer.
 - b. Spokespersons will include the above decision-makers as well as the MOE's Information Officer and the Director of the National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO), depending on the circumstances.
- 4. Channels
 - a. The MOE will use the internal information dissemination system that is built into its structure. Executive decisions of different kinds will be made by the Minister of Education and/or the Permanent Secretary, whereas technical and educational decisions will be made by the Chief Education Officer (CEO). Information from this top level will be communicated to 13 District



Education Officers (DEOs) stationed around the country via fax, bulletin, or in meetings. The DEOs will, in turn, communicate with the school principals, either in periodic district-level meetings with all of the principals or by memos or faxes. The principals then will pass the information to the teachers in their schools, individually, or in staff meetings. The teachers will pass the information to students in their classrooms.

- b. When the government wishes to inform parents, the community, and the general public about an education-related matter of general interest, students are asked to take the information home to their parents. Students may be given a printed flyer or they may be asked to copy a message for parents into their notebooks so they do not forget.
- c. Mass media will be used for urgent country-wide announcements, such as an emergency school closing.
- 5. Resources
 - a. Prior to and during a pandemic, the MOE will require printed materials and access to meeting facilities.
 - b. Mass media production and access, if needed, will be provided by the Government Information Service (GIS).
- 6. Roles and Responsibilities
 - a. Education Sector Communication responses will follow procedures established in the Government of Saint Lucia Avian Influenza Preparedness Plan.
 - b. NEMO will coordinate the flow of information between the MOE and other government ministries and agencies, assuring consistency, accuracy, and timeliness.
 - c. The Minister of Education is normally the final approving authority for the content and timing of communications to the school system. This authority may be delegated by the Minister to the Permanent Secretary and/or Chief Education Officer.
 - d. Public spokespersons may include the Minister, Permanent Secretary, CEO, and/or the Information Officer.
 - e. Mass media support, if needed, will be mobilized and supported by the GIS.
 - f. The MOE will have special responsibility for educating children about a possible avian influenza pandemic, including the nature of the disease, its transmission, and preventive behaviors.
 - g. The MOE will in collaboration with the Ministry of Health continuously monitor the threat of transmission of influenza to children in schools. In conjunction with the Ministry of Health, the MOE will promptly make the decision to close schools when needed to protect students and contain the spread of influenza and will communicate the decision to students and parents.
 - h. The MOE will in collaboration with the Ministry of Health will provide training for its teachers and administrative and support staff in preparation for an avian influenza pandemic.
 - i. The MOH will select written materials prior to an emergency and will have them ready for printing and distribution when needed.

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
1	Spreading pandemic; schools are still open.	To explain the situation and the dangers of infection in schools. To prepare District Education Officers for school closures.	A dangerous pandemic is spreading. To help contain the pandemic and protect students, schools may close. Continue to send students to school until schools close. Students should be instructed in preventive measures.	District Education Officers	6	Crisis communication	Ministry of Education
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
1	Chief Education Officer	Chief Education Officer	Memorandum and meeting of Chief Education Officer with District Education Officers	When human cases have been detected	Meeting venue, printed background materials	Feedback from District Education Officers after meeting	

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
2	Decision made to close schools following evidence of human to human transmission.	To close schools in a calm and orderly manner.	All schools are closed to protect students from a spreading pandemic.	Parents and teachers	6	Crisis communication	Ministry of Education
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
2	Minister of Education and Minister of Health	Chief Medical Officer	Technical briefing of MOE officials by MOH	When human cases have been detected	Meeting venue, printed background materials	Feedback from MOE officials following briefing	

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
3	School personnel have limited information and have made insufficient preparations for a spreading pandemic.	To inform and prepare school personnel for a spreading pandemic.	A dangerous pandemic is spreading. Information regarding the epidemiological situation in the country. Preparations are underway. Anticipate school closures. Education personnel should inform students and families about the situation and about preventive measures.	Education Officers and Ministry of Education officials	6	Crisis communication	Ministry of Education
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
3	Minister of Education and Minister of Health	Chief Medical Officer	Technical briefing of MOE officials by MOH	When human cases have been detected	Meeting venue, printed background materials	Feedback from MOE officials following briefing	

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
4	Principals have limited information and have made insufficient preparations for a spreading pandemic.	To inform and prepare principals for a spreading pandemic.	A dangerous pandemic is spreading. Information regarding the epidemiological situation in the country. Preparations are underway. Anticipate school closures. Principals should inform teachers and other school personnel about the situation and about preventive measures.	Principals	6	Crisis communication	Ministry of Education

ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
	Chief Education Officer	District Education Officers	Meeting of Chief Education Officer with District Education Officers, printed material	When human cases have been detected	Meeting venue, printed background materials	Feedback from District Education Officers following briefing	
ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
5	Teachers and ancillary staff have limited information and have made insufficient preparations for a spreading pandemic	To inform and prepare teachers and auxiliary staff for pandemic. To inform teachers of special personal protection measures.	A dangerous pandemic is spreading. Information regarding the epidemiological situation in the country. Preparations are underway. Anticipate school closures. Teachers should inform students and families about the situation and about preventive measures. Teachers and auxiliary staff should implement personal protection measures.	Teachers and ancillary staff	6	Crisis communication	Ministry of Education
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
5	District Education Officers	Principals	School staff meetings	When human cases have been detected	Printed materials for teachers	Mini-survey of teachers	

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
6	Students and parents have limited information and have made insufficient preparations for a spreading pandemic	To inform and prepare students and parents for pandemic. To inform students and parents regarding preventive measures. To activate emergency standard operating procedures.	A dangerous pandemic is spreading. Information regarding the epidemiological situation in the country. Preparations are underway. Anticipate school closures; in the event of a closure, teachers will inform students. Teachers will provide each student with a note to take home that will inform his or her family about the situation and about preventive measures.	Students	6	Risk communication	Ministry of Education
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
6	Minister of Education	Teachers	Crisis avian influenza lessons for students, accompanying printed material	When human cases have been detected and school closing possible	Printed materials for students and parents	Follow-up quiz and discussion with students in classroom; mini-survey of parents	


ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE


							INSTITUTION
7	Education officials have limited information and have made insufficient preparations for a possible pandemic (no human to human transmission reported yet).	To create awareness and understanding of avian influenza among education officials.	Information regarding the nature of the disease, transmission, dangers, and precautionary measures.	Education officials	4	Risk communication	Ministry of Education
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
7	Chief Education Officer in consultation with Chief Medical Officer	Director of Epidemiology	Briefing of Ministry of Education officials	Prior to outbreak, as soon as possible	Printed material for education sector	Feedback from education officials following briefing	

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
8	School principals have limited information and have made insufficient preparations for a possible pandemic (no human to human transmission reported yet).	To create awareness and understanding of avian influenza among school principals.	Information regarding the nature of the disease, transmission, dangers, and precautionary measures.	School principals	4	Risk communication	Ministry of Education
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
8	Chief Education Officer	District Education Officers	Meeting between District Education Officers and principals	Prior to outbreak, as soon as possible	Printed material for schools	Feedback from principals following meetings	

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
9	School teachers have limited information and have made insufficient preparations for a possible pandemic (no human to human transmission reported yet).	To create awareness and understanding of avian influenza among school teachers.	Information regarding the nature of the disease, transmission, dangers, and precautionary measures.	School teachers	4	Risk communication	Ministry of Education
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
9	District Education Officers	Principal	School staff meetings at which principal briefs teachers and provides printed material	Prior to outbreak, as soon as possible	Printed material for schools	Mini-survey of teachers	

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
10	Students and parents have limited information and have made insufficient preparations for a possible pandemic (no human to human transmission reported yet).	To create awareness and understanding of avian influenza among students and parents.	Information regarding the nature of the disease, transmission, dangers, and precautionary measures.	Students and parents	4	Risk communication	Ministry of Education
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
10	Chief Education Officer	Teachers	Teachers provide lessons to students in pandemic basics and protective behavior; printed material for parents provided to students to take home	Prior to outbreak, as soon as possible	Printed material for students to deliver to parents	Quiz of students; mini- survey of teachers.	





National Influenza Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan



C. Agriculture Sector Standard Operating Procedures: Avian and Pandemic Influenza Communication in Saint Lucia

LEAD AGENCY: MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE

Introduction

In the event of an avian influenza (AI) outbreak in Saint Lucia, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (MOAFF) will collect and disseminate information about the spread of the disease among animals and between animals and humans. It will communicate timely, accurate, and understandable information about the outbreak to policymakers, international organizations, farmers, and the public. It will monitor the food supply and communicate with food producers, distributors, and consumers concerning the safety and availability of food.

How to Use the Agriculture Sector AI Strategy

This document summarizes avian and pandemic flu communications requirements in Saint Lucia's agriculture sector. The document contains three sections:

1. Agriculture Sector Standard Operating Procedures (Page 33)

Section 1 explains how the agriculture sector will prepare for and respond to an outbreak of avian or pandemic influenza in Saint Lucia. It provides operational guidelines for the following:

- The *functions* that communication will perform in an outbreak
- The *audiences* to whom communication will be directed
- The *decision-makers and spokespersons* who will manage and implement communication
- Communications channels
- The *resources* that will be required for preparation and response
- The *roles and responsibilities* of individuals and organizations in the event of an outbreak
- 2. Agriculture Sector Pandemic Situations and Communications Responses (Page 35)

An outbreak can present multiple communications challenges to the agriculture sector in Saint Lucia. Section 2 presents some specific situations that could occur, along with detailed guidance on how to prepare for or respond to them with effective communication. As Saint Lucia's agriculture sector periodically reviews, updates, and practices the Communications Strategy, new situations should be added to Section 2. For each situation, Section 2 identifies:

- The *objective* that communication should accomplish
- The specific *audience* affected by the situation
- The pandemic *phase* in which the situation could arise
- The *communications approach* (risk, crisis, or behavior change communication)
- The *institution* responsible for communication
- The *individual* responsible for managing, overseeing, and approving communications
- The *spokesperson* who actually communicates with the public or the media
- The *communications channels* that will be used
- The *timing* of messages
- The *resources* required for communications interventions



- How communication will be *monitored* for effectiveness
- 3. Agriculture Sector Case Study Flow Chart (Page 38)

Planning for emergencies requires anticipating different contingencies. Flow charts can be useful tools for planning and implementing communications interventions when different possible events need to be anticipated. Section 3 presents a flow chart illustrating how the agriculture sector in Saint Lucia would work its way through one set of circumstances associated with an AI outbreak. Making flow charts such as the one in Section 3 ensures that a communications intervention will be the best possible response in a rapidly changing and unfamiliar environment.

Section 1: Agriculture Sector Standard Operating Procedures

- 1. Communications Functions
 - a. Compile and interpret information for dissemination about infected animals and about transmission between animals and humans.
 - b. Instruct food producers and distributors about measures to take to protect themselves and consumers.
 - c. Inform the public and decision-makers about the nature of the disease in birds and how transmission to humans could take place.
 - d. Inform partners and the Government of Saint Lucia (GOSL) about the impact of AI on the agricultural economy and the nutritional status of the population.
 - e. Educate the public concerning animal and food-related behaviors to protect against AI.
- 2. Audiences
 - a. Internal audiences include MOAFF executives and policymakers, technical and administrative staff, and field agents.
 - b. External audiences include GOSL decision-makers, the general public, farmers, the agriculture industry organizations and associations, food importers, food retailers, and distributors.
- 3. Communications Decision-Makers and Spokespersons
 - a. Individuals who will approve the timing, content, and distribution of communications during a pandemic include the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, the Permanent Secretary, and/or the Chief Veterinary Officer.
 - b. Spokespersons will include the above decision-makers as well as the MOAFF Information Officer and the Director of the National Emergency Management Organisation (NEMO), depending on the circumstances.

4. Channels

- a. The agriculture sector will communicate internally using mail, email, fax, internet, memos, and meetings.
- b. Communication with farmers and producers will use visits to farms, printed advisories, and media announcements.
- c. For crisis communication, the MOAFF will issue press releases and convene press conferences for the national, local, and international news media.



- 5. Resources
 - a. Prior to and during a pandemic, the MOAFF will provide printed materials, meeting facilities, vehicles, and field staff for communications purposes.
 - b. Mass media production and access, if needed, will be provided by the Government Information Service (GIS).
- 6. Roles and Responsibilities
 - a. Agriculture sector communications responses will follow procedures established in the Government of Saint Lucia Avian Influenza Preparedness Plan.
 - b. NEMO will coordinate the flow of information between the MOAFF and other government ministries and agencies, ensuring consistency, accuracy, and timeliness.
 - c. The Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry is normally the final approving authority for the content and timing of communications concerning the agriculture sector. This authority may be delegated by the Minister to the Permanent Secretary or Chief Veterinary Officer. Public spokespersons may include the Minister, Permanent Secretary, Chief Veterinary Officer, and/or the Information Officer.
 - d. Mass media support, if needed, will be provided by the GIS.
 - e. The MOAFF will be responsible for educating food producers and distributors about a possible AI pandemic, including the nature of the disease, its transmission, and preventive behaviors.
 - f. The MOAFF will continuously monitor the threat of influenza transmission among animals or between animals and humans.
 - g. In conjunction with the Ministry of Health, the MOAFF will promptly take actions to contain the spread of AI and immediately communicate the measures it is taking to farmers, policymakers, and the public.
 - h. The MOAFF will provide training for its staff and for poultry farmers in preparation for an AI pandemic.
 - i. The Ministry of Health will provide surveillance of any outbreak of influenza among animals, wild or domestic, and will communicate data promptly to national and international organizations.

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
1	Confirmed infected imported chicken meat for sale to public and in ports; media leak to public.	To provide information about risk factors and containment of the situation.	Information on the location of incident or product, and how to identify suspect meat. Updates will be provided as the situation unfolds. No one is in immediate danger.	General population, Customs, stevedores (port workers), veterinary personnel, Saint Lucia Port Authority	3	Risk communication joint communiqué from responsible agencies to reflect how the situation was handled	Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry; Solid Waste Management; Saint Lucia Port Authority, Ministry of Commerce**? Bureau of Standards?
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
1	MOAFF's Permanent Secretary and Chief Veterinary Officer will provide information to the Information Unit, which refines message and authorizes it for release	Chief Veterinary Officer or Permanent Secretary	Internal (meetings, phone, written documentation) and the public (mass media)	After lab confirmation of infected meat and official approval; press updates as frequently as needed	Contact list for internal communication, Government Information Service media list, information for port workers and Solid Waste Management employees, training in handling potentially contaminated meat	Done by communications agencies, MOAFF and GIS	

Section 2: Agriculture Sector Pandemic Situations and Communications Responses

Exception in case of danger to public


Section 47. (1) Where it appears to the Director that goods of a particular kind create an imminent risk of death, serious illness or serious injury, the director shall without delay publish a notice in the Gazette and at least two newspapers in general and at least weekly circulation in Saint Lucia declaring the goods to be unsafe under section 31 or compulsorily recalling the goods under section 39(1) in relation to the goods.

Section 2: Agriculture Sector Pandemic Situations and Communications Responses

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
2	Confirmed infected imported chicken meat for sale to public and distributed to resellers.	To warn distributors and consumers, preventing panic and recalling infected meat.	Well cooked chicken meat is not dangerous, but infected meat that has not been consumed should be returned.	Consumers and retailers.	4	Risk communication Behavioral change communication	Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry; Ministry of Health/Nutrition Department; Royal Saint Lucia Police Force, National Emergency Management Organisation
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
2	MOH's Epidemiologist and Chief Medical Officer (CMO), MOAFF's Chief Veterinary Officer, Commissioner of Police, Government Information Service (distribution of message)	Chief Medical Officer , Chief Veterinary Officer (agriculture)	Internal (meetings, phone, written documentation), external/public (media), international (health regulations)	After rapid test diagnosis and as information becomes available	Contact list for internal communication	Monitor environs, and all farms	

Section 2: Agriculture Sector Pandemic Situations and Communications Responses

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
3	Infected pet bird on farm premises; child has confirmed symptoms of AI after bird dies.	To provide information about risk factors, control panic, and promote appropriate preventive actions and behavioral changes.	 Express empathy for family and neighbors. Information on AI, including symptoms, and facts about the case. Reassure the public regarding the degree of risk and reinforce the message on how people can protect themselves. Tell people what you do not know. Explain what actions are being taken. Explain what people should do if they experience symptoms. 	General population, residents in vicinity, medical professionals, poultry farmers	4	Risk communication Crisis communication Behavioral change communication Advocacy communication	Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, National Emergency Management Organisation, Royal Saint Lucia Police Force, Ministry of Tourism
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
3	Minister of Health and Minister of Agriculture	Ministry of Health Information Officer	Mass media: radio and TV news bulletins	Updates at least 3 times a day, morning, afternoon, and evening	Government Information Service emergency access to all national news media	Mini-surveys of public awareness of outbreak every 3 days	



National Influenza Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan



D. Tourism Sector Standard Operating Procedures: Avian and Pandemic Influenza Communication in Saint Lucia

LEAD AGENCY: MINISTRY OF TOURISM

Introduction

Tourism is an important engine of Saint Lucia's economy. It is also a potential avenue for the international transmission of avian influenza (AI) into or out of Saint Lucia. In the event of an avian influenza (AI) pandemic, the Ministry of Tourism (MOT) will have responsibility for monitoring the spread of the disease to and from travelers and protecting both the tourists and the population of the island. The MOT will communicate timely, accurate, and understandable information about the outbreak to travelers, travel companies, the media, policymakers, international organizations, and the public.

How To Use the Tourism Sector AI Communications Strategy

This document summarizes avian and pandemic flu communications requirements in Saint Lucia's tourism sector. The document contains three sections:

1. Tourism Sector Standard Operating Procedures (Page 40)

Section 1 explains how the tourism sector will prepare for and respond to an outbreak of avian or pandemic influenza in Saint Lucia. It provides operational guidelines for the following:

- The *functions* that communication will perform in an outbreak
- The *audiences* to whom communication will be directed
- The *decision-makers and spokespersons* who will manage and implement communication
- Communications channels
- The *resources* that will be required for preparation and response
- The *roles and responsibilities* of individuals and organizations in the event of an outbreak
- 2. Tourism Sector Pandemic Situations and Communications Responses (Page 42)

An outbreak can present multiple communications challenges to the tourism sector in Saint Lucia. Section 2 presents some specific situations that could occur, along with detailed guidance on how to prepare for or respond to them with effective communication. As Saint Lucia's tourism sector periodically reviews, updates, and practices the Communications Strategy, new situations should be added to Section 2. For each situation, Section 2 identifies:

- The *objective* that communication should accomplish
- The specific *audience* affected by the situation
- The pandemic *phase* in which the situation could arise
- The *communications approach* (risk, crisis, or behavior change communication)
- The *institution* responsible for communication
- The *individual* responsible for managing, overseeing, and approving communications
- The *spokesperson* who actually communicates with the public or the media
- The *communications channels* that will be used
- The *timing* of messages
- The *resources* required for communications interventions



- How communication will be *monitored* for effectiveness
- 3. Tourism Sector Case Study Flow Chart (Page 45)

Planning for emergencies requires anticipating different contingencies. Flow charts can be useful tools for planning and implementing communications interventions when different possible events need to be anticipated. Section 3 presents a flow chart illustrating how the tourism sector in Saint Lucia would work through one set of circumstances associated with an AI outbreak. Making flow charts such as the one in Section 3 ensures that a communications intervention will be the best possible response in a rapidly changing and unfamiliar environment.

Section 1: Tourism Sector Standard Operating Procedures

- 1. Communications Functions
 - a. Phase 4
 - i. Inform the tourism industry in Saint Lucia (hotels, airlines, tourist agencies and guides, cruise ship companies, and restaurants) about AI, the implications of different outbreak scenarios, and the Government of Saint Lucia Preparedness Plan. Encourage companies to develop AI contingency plans.
 - ii. Inform Ministries of Health and Tourism about the special concerns of tourists and the tourist industry in the event of an AI outbreak.
 - iii. Develop prototype messages and materials for possible use in an outbreak.
 - b. Phase 6
 - i. Maintain continuous flow of current information about the outbreak to the tourism industry.
 - ii. Offer information directly to concerned tourists about the outbreak and personal protection measures they can take.
 - iii. Explain the Government of Saint Lucia (GOSL) response to the outbreak. Offer options to tourists and facilitate early departures and cancellations if requested.
 - iv. Explain the international importance of preventing transmission among countries by means of travelers.
- 2. Audiences
 - a. Internal audiences include MOT policy, technical, and administrative staff, as well as other GOSL ministries and agencies.
 - b. External audiences include arriving, departing, and visiting tourists; owners of hotels and cruise ships; employees of hotels, cruise ships, restaurants, and tourist shops; airline and airport crews; and travel agencies.
- 3. Communications Decision-Makers and Spokespersons
 - Individuals who will determine the timing, content, and distribution of communications during a
 pandemic include the Minister of Tourism and the Permanent Secretary. Decisions about closings
 and cancellations will be made by executives of travel companies, including hotels and airlines.
 In the extreme case of closing the borders, the decision will be made by the Prime Minister in
 consultation with international organizations.



b. Spokespersons will include the above decision-makers as well as the Information Officer and the Director of the National Emergency Management Organisation (NEMO), depending on the circumstances.

4. Channels

- a. The MOT will communicate with its private partners in the tourism industry, and directly with tourists, by means of a television channel operated for visitors. It will also communicate using mail, memos, visits, and meetings.
- b. For crisis communication, the MOT will make use of the national and international news media to get messages out quickly.

5. Resources

- a. Prior to and during a pandemic, the MOT will require printed materials and access to meeting facilities.
- b. Mass media production and access, if needed, will be provided by the Government Information Service (GIS).

6. Roles and Responsibilities

- a. Tourism sector communications responses will follow procedures established in the Government of Saint Lucia Avian Influenza Preparedness Plan.
- b. NEMO will coordinate the flow of information between the MOT and other government ministries and agencies, ensuring consistency, accuracy, and timeliness.
- c. The Minister of Tourism is normally the final approving authority for the content and timing of communications concerning the tourism sector. This authority may be delegated by the Minister to the Permanent Secretary. Public spokespersons may include the Minister, Permanent Secretary, and/or the Information Officer.
- d. Mass media support, if needed, will be provided by the GIS.
- e. The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry will have special responsibility for informing tourist facilities, tour companies, transportation providers, and visitors themselves about a possible avian influenza pandemic, including the nature of the disease, its transmission, and preventive behaviors.
- f. The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry will continuously monitor the threat of transmission of influenza between visitors and the local population. In conjunction with the Ministry of Health, the MOT will promptly make decisions to contain the spread of avian influenza and communicate these decisions immediately to tourists and the tourism industry.
- g. The MOT will provide training and information for its staff and for the tourism industry in preparation for an AI pandemic.
- h. The MOT will have the dual priorities of protecting Saint Lucians and protecting travelers. In the event of an outbreak, the MOT will give top priority to protecting the peace of mind and well-being of visitors, regardless of the economic costs.
- i. The MOT will communicate throughout commercial tourism media channels the measures that the government and the industry are taking to protect visitors, projecting the image of an organized and thorough response.

Section 2: Tourism Sector Pandemic Situations and Communications Responses

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
1	Cases in persons with a recent history of travel.	To identify possible cases of persons infected with influenza.	Describe symptoms and ask individuals to voluntarily declare whether they suspect they may be infected.	Pilots and air crew, recent travelers, general population	4	Risk communication Behavior change communication	Ministry of Health, Ministry of Tourism WHAT ABOUT SLTB? SLHTA?
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
1	Minister of Health, Minister of Tourism, Ministry of Tourism Ship Agents	MOT's Communications Officer, PR Officer	Hotels, phones, tour operators, airlines, media, employers, associate organizations	Beginning immediately; ongoing, as frequently as needed	List of partner contacts, media list, brochures, posters, checklist of symptoms	Cases reported to health authorities among people with contact with tourists.	

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
2	General population—and tourism industry employees in particular— not taking measures to protect themselves and prevent transmission (prior to and during outbreak).	To change behavior and promote preventive measures.	Promote behaviors that reduce the risk of infection, such as avoiding contact with birds and good hygiene.	General population	4-6	Risk communication Behavior change communication	Ministry of Health (Bureau of Health Education)
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
2	Director of Bureau of Health Education, Principal Information Officer, union leaders, education officials	Chief Medical Officer, GIS, prominent citizens)	TV, radio, print, You- Tube	Immediately and ongoing	Access to media coordinated by GIS; printing and distribution of instructive pamphlets and posters	Brief interviews of supervisors of tourism industry employees	

Section 2: Tourism Sector Pandemic Situations and Communications Responses


ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
3	Cruise visitors fearful of entering port (prior to and during outbreak).	To reassure visitors and build confidence by providing information about the local situation and the risk to visitors.	Explain the current situation with respect to the pandemic and preventive measures being taken.	Cruise visitors	4-6	Risk communication Behavior change communication	Ministry of Health and Ministry of Tourism
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
3	MOH Information Officer and the, PR Manager (of Ministry of Tourism	MOH Information Officer and the, PR Manager (of Ministry of Tourism	Meeting with tourists on ship, broadcast through ship's public announcement system	Immediately after obtaining scientific and other facts about the situation; continue updates if status changes	Public announcement system; list of contacts on board ship and at Ministry of Health and Tourism Board	Visually monitor behavior and attitudes of tourists on board and determine whether they still have questions; provide information as needed	

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
4	One documented case in a human identified anywhere in Saint Lucia.	To contain panic and prevent the spread of the disease. To inform and reassure the travel industry (internally and overseas) that the situation is being properly addressed.	Explain the extent of the infection and measures being taken to contain it. Provide accurate numbers and statistics.	Local population, visitors, travel representatives, media (local, regional, and international)	6	Risk communication Crisis communication	Ministry of Health and Health Centres
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
4	Minister of Health	Minister of Health, Chief Medical Officer or Director Bureau of Health Education	Media, CBOs and FBOs, fax, telephone, medical facilities, posters, bulletins, etc.	Immediately after case is confirmed after rapid test in SLU; ongoing until reconfirmed by lab at Caribbean Epidemiology Center and US reference lab	Health Centre	Mini-surveys of tourists and population	

Section 2: Tourism Sector Pandemic Situations and Communications Responses

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
5	Hotel guests concerned about pandemic and panic.	To contain panic and reassure guests that measures are in place to reduce the risk of infection.	Explain the measures that are being taken. Facilitate early departure and checkout if necessary.	Hotel guests, hospitality staff	4-6	Risk communication Behavior change communication	Saint Lucia Hotel and Tourism Association, Saint Lucia Tourist Board, hotel management
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
5	Permanent Secretary Ministry of Tourism	SLTB/PRO	Visitor Channel Flyers, Letter from GOSL/MOT	immediate	МОТ	Brief exit survey of departing tourists	

Section 3: Tourism Sector Case Study Flow Chart





E. Security Sector Standard Operating Procedures: Avian and Pandemic Influenza Communication in Saint Lucia

LEAD AGENCY: [NOT SURE]:

MNINSTRY OF NATIONAL SECURITY ROYAL SAINT LUCIA POLICE FORCE

Introduction

In the event of an avian influenza (AI) pandemic, the Royal Saint Lucia Police Force will be responsible for maintaining order. As an AI outbreak spreads and puts stresses on the people and institutions of Saint Lucia, the likelihood of disruptions increases. In a Phase 6 situation, crime and panic could become widespread and deadly. Such an emergency could be further exacerbated if members of the police force are also infected. Police officers themselves are communicators in an emergency. They must be supported by communication from high levels of the government explaining the security measures that the police are implementing.

How to Use the Security Sector AI Strategy

This document summarizes avian and pandemic flu communications requirements in Saint Lucia's security sector. The document contains three sections:

1. Security Sector Standard Operating Procedures (Page 47)

Section 1 explains how the security sector will prepare for and respond to an outbreak of avian or pandemic influenza in Saint Lucia. It provides operational guidelines for the following:

- The *functions* that communication will perform in an outbreak
- The *audiences* to whom communication will be directed
- The *decision-makers and spokespersons* who will manage and implement communication
- Communication channels
- The *resources* that will be required for preparation and response
- The *roles and responsibilities* of individuals and organizations in the event of an outbreak
- 2. Security Sector Pandemic Situations and Communications Responses (Page 49)

An outbreak can present multiple communications challenges to the security sector in Saint Lucia. Section 2 presents some specific situations that could occur, along with detailed guidance on how to prepare for or respond to them with effective communication. As Saint Lucia's security sector periodically reviews, updates, and practices the Communications Strategy, new situations should be added to Section 2. For each situation, Section 2 identifies:

- The *objective* that communication should accomplish
- The specific *audience* affected by the situation
- The pandemic *phase* in which the situation could arise
- The *communications approach* (risk, crisis, or behavior change communication)
- The *institution* responsible for communication
- The *individual* responsible for managing, overseeing, and approving communications
- The *spokesperson* who actually communicates with the public or the media
- The *communications channels* that will be used



- The *timing* of messages
- The *resources* required for communications interventions
- How communication will be *monitored* for effectiveness

3. Security Sector Case Study Flow Chart (Page 51)

Planning for emergencies requires anticipating different contingencies. Flow charts can be useful tools for planning and implementing communications interventions when different possible events need to be anticipated. Section 3 presents a flow chart illustrating how the security sector in Saint Lucia would work its way through one set of circumstances associated with an AI outbreak. Making flow charts such as the one in Section 3 ensures that a communications intervention will be the best possible response in a rapidly changing and unfamiliar environment.

Section 1: Security Sector Standard Operating Procedures

- 1. Communications Functions
 - a. Phase 4
 - i. Inform staff of the Royal Saint Lucia Police Force, the Saint Lucia Fire Service, Customs, Immigration, and Saint Lucia Air and Seaports Authority (SLASPA) about AI and the implications of possible outbreak scenarios in Saint Lucia.
 - ii. Disseminate the Government of Saint Lucia Pandemic Preparedness Plan to government and private security personnel and first responders, provide training, and involve them in simulations. Provide special training in communicating with the population when fear and uncertainty threaten public order.
 - b. Phase 6
 - i. Communicate emergency security measures to the population and government and private security forces. Urge calm and explain sanctions in case of disorderly behaviors.
- 2. Audiences
 - a. Internal audiences include government and private security personnel and first responders.
 - b. The external audience is the population of the country.
- 3. Communications Decision-Makers and Spokespersons
 - a. Individuals who will determine the timing, content, and distribution of communications during a pandemic include the Commissioner of Police, the Prime Minister, and the Permanent Secretary.
 - b. Spokespersons will include the above decision-makers as well as the Police Information Officer and the Director of the National Emergency Management Organisation (NEMO), depending on the circumstances.
- 4. Channels
 - a. Security personnel will communicate orally with the population as they work to maintain order and help people.
 - b. Public information supporting police actions and explaining security measures will use the national broadcast media.
- 5. Resources



- a. The Ministry of Health and NEMO will provide information and training to involved security organizations as part of preparedness planning. Print materials and training venues will be needed.
- b. Mass media production and access, if needed, will be provided by the Government Information Service (GIS).
- 6. Roles and Responsibilities
 - a. Security-related communications responses will follow procedures established in the Government of Saint Lucia Avian Influenza Preparedness Plan.
 - b. NEMO will coordinate the flow of information between the police and other government ministries and agencies, ensuring consistency, accuracy, and timeliness.
 - c. The Commissioner of Police is normally the final approving authority for the content and timing of communications concerning public security. This authority may be delegated to the Information Officer. In the event of a national emergency, the Prime Minister may assume the role of spokesperson.
 - d. Mass media support, if needed, will be provided by the GIS.
 - e. The Royal Saint Lucia Police Force will have special responsibility for protecting sources of food and medical services in the event of an outbreak and will inform the public orally of instructions to maintain order. Loudspeakers and radio announcements may reinforce police instructions.
 - f. The Royal Saint Lucia Police Force will coordinate with Customs and NEMO to protect the borders, should an emergency require special vigilance or regulation.

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
1	General panic overwhelming health and pharmaceutical facilities caused by rapidly spreading human-to-human cases.	To reestablish order.	Explain the reason for heightened security measures.	Law enforcement agencies, general population	6	Crisis communication	Royal Saint Lucia Police Force, National Emergency Management Organisation
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
1	Prime Minister, Permanent Secretary, Chief of Police, Director of NEMO	Prime Minister, COP, OiC Operations, Director of NEMO	Radio, television	Beginning immediately when disorders are reported and continuing as long as disorder persists	Emergency media coverage	Police reports	

Section 2: Security Sector Pandemic Situations and Communications Responses


ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
2	Traffic congestion in and around public health facilities caused by rapidly spreading human-to-human cases.	To minimize unnecessary vehicle traffic in these areas.	Stay home and do not venture out unnecessarily. Curtail activity that may promote the spread of the disease.	General population, law enforcement agencies, media	6	Crisis communication	Traffic police
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
2	Chief of Police	Chief of Police, OiC Traffic	Radio, television	Continuous as long as traffic persists	Emergency media time	Police reports	

Section 2: Security Sector Pandemic Situations and Communications Responses

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
3	Looting of medical supplies caused by rapidly spreading human-to-human cases.	To secure the stock of medical supplies.	Explain the importance of getting the medicine to those who need it the most.	Potential thieves, law enforcement, general population	6	Crisis communication	Royal Saint Lucia Police Force, Ministry of Health
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
3	Chief of Police Minister of Health	Police and MOH spokespersons	Radio, television	Continuous until looting stops	Emergency media time	Ministry of Health reports	

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
4	Panic at ports during mass exodus caused by rapidly spreading human-to-human cases.	To establish order. To reestablish proper procedures for exit. To assure officials of other countries that the situation is under control.	Everything is being done to facilitate the safe, orderly departure of visitors and the safety of residents. The established exit procedures will ensure everyone's safety.	Travelers, ground staff, immigration officials, Port Royal Santa Lucia Police, travel agents, family members of the travelers	6	Crisis communication	Port Authority, Ministry of Tourism, tourist facilities, cruise ships, airlines
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
4	Minister of Tourism	Airline and cruise ship spokespersons, Chief of Police, Minister of Tourism	Television (visitors' channel), posters and signs in tourist facilities and transit points	Continuous until panic subsides	Signs, posters	Ministry of Tourism reports	

Section 3: Security Sector Case Study Flow Chart





F. Food Sector Standard Operating Procedures: Avian and Pandemic Influenza Communication in Saint Lucia

LEAD AGENCY: MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE

Introduction

In a pandemic avian influenza (AI) outbreak, the safety and availability of food for the population can be a major concern. Insufficient information about food safety and availability can lead to fear, unhealthy behaviors, food hoarding, theft, food riots, and even starvation. Communication about the safety and availability of food depends on continuous rapid assessments of the food situation. Timely, accurate, and practical information must be communicated to purchasers, consumers, producers, and distributors of food to prevent panic and disorder. Food-related crisis communication is the responsibility of communicators in the Government of Saint Lucia and in Saint Lucia's food industry.

How to Use the Food Sector AI Strategy

This document summarizes avian and pandemic flu communications requirements in Saint Lucia's food sector. The document contains three sections:

1. Food Sector Standard Operating Procedures (Page 53)

Section 1 explains how the food sector will prepare for and respond to an outbreak of avian influenza or pandemic flu in Saint Lucia. It provides operational guidelines for the following:

- The *functions* that communication will perform in an outbreak
- The *audiences* to whom communication will be directed
- The *decision-makers and spokespersons* who will manage and implement communication
- Communication channels
- The *resources* that will be required for preparation and response
- The *roles and responsibilities* of individuals and organizations in the event of an outbreak
- 2. Food Sector Pandemic Situations and Communications Responses (Page 55)

An outbreak can present multiple communications challenges to the food sector in Saint Lucia. Section 2 presents some specific situations that could occur, along with detailed guidance on how to prepare for or respond to them with effective communication. As Saint Lucia's food sector periodically reviews, updates, and practices the Communications Strategy, new situations should be added to Section 2. For each situation, Section 2 identifies:

- The *objective* that communication should accomplish
- The specific *audience* affected by the situation
- The pandemic *phase* in which the situation could arise
- The *communications approach* (risk, crisis, or behavior change communication)
- The *institution* responsible for communication
- The *individual* responsible for managing, overseeing, and approving communications
- The *spokesperson* who actually communicates with the public or the media
- The *communications channels* that will be used
- The *timing* of messages



- The *resources* required for communications interventions
- How communication will be *monitored* for effectiveness
- 3. Food Sector Case Study Flow Chart (Page 58)

Planning for emergencies requires anticipating different contingencies. Flow charts can be useful tools for planning and implementing communications interventions when different possible events need to be anticipated. Section 3 presents a flow chart illustrating how the food sector in Saint Lucia would work its way through one set of circumstances associated with an AI outbreak. Making flow charts such as the one in Section 3 ensures that a communications intervention will be the best possible response in a rapidly changing and unfamiliar environment.

Section 1: Food Sector Standard Operating Procedures

- 1. Communications Functions
 - a. Phase 4
 - i. Inform food producers and distributors about AI and the potential disruptions of different AI outbreak scenarios.
 - ii. Encourage residents to engage in routine, prudent stockpiling of food and home production in anticipation of outbreak-related shortages
 - b. Phase 6
 - i. Inform food producers and distributors about personal protection behaviors, the dangers of transmission associated with transporting and retailing food, the dangers of infected food, and any emergency food distribution activities.
 - ii. Discourage excessive panic buying and hoarding of food by residents. Encourage reasonable family reserves, eating less to conserve and stretch reserves, and consuming private garden food.
 - iii. Maintain constant flow of information to the public about the food situation, the availability and shortages of food products, the dangers of infection associated with public markets, and the dangers of contaminated food.
- 2. Audiences
 - a. Internal audiences include the Ministries of Health; Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry; Education; Tourism; Trade; and Communications, Works, Transport, and Public Utilities.
 - b. External audiences include the Chamber of Commerce; middlemen and transporters of food; food marketers and retailers; and food preparers and consumers (including the public and restaurants).
- 3. Communications Decision-Makers and Spokespersons
 - Individuals who will determine the timing, content, and distribution of communication during a
 pandemic include the Ministers of Health; Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry; Education;
 Tourism; Trade; and Communications, Works, Transport, and Public Utilities. The National
 Emergency Management Organisation (NEMO) will provide coordination.
 - b. Spokespersons will include the above decision-makers as well as the ministries' Information Officers and the Director of NEMO, depending on the circumstances.



- 4. Channels
 - a. Communication will take place by means of posters, announcements, and billboards in locations where food is marketed to the public.
 - b. Public service announcements will be made on the national mass media
 - c. The Ministry of Education will communicate about food and nutrition during an outbreak with school children and parents using bulletins and take-home information.
- 5. Resources
 - a. Posters, bulletins, and billboards will need to be printed on short notice.
 - b. Mass media production and access, if needed, will be provided by the Government Information Service (GIS), coordinated by NEMO.
- 6. Roles and Responsibilities
 - a. Food sector communications responses will follow procedures established in the Government of Saint Lucia Avian Influenza Preparedness Plan.
 - b. NEMO will coordinate the decision-making and the flow of information among the different ministries that are involved with food issues.
 - c. Ministers of involved ministries will normally be the final approving authority for the content and timing of communications concerning the food issues. This authority may be delegated by the Ministers to Permanent Secretaries or other technical units. Public spokespersons may be the Ministers, Permanent Secretaries, in-house nutrition experts, Information Officers, or the First Lady.
 - d. Representatives and owners of private sector partners (food importers, shippers, dockworkers, transporters, middlemen, marketers and retailers) will be mobilized by NEMO as needed on a voluntary basis. Influential supermarket owners may serve as credible co-spokespersons along with government officials.
 - e. Mass media support, if needed, will be provided by the GIS.
 - f. The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry will have special responsibility for educating food producers and distributors about a possible AI pandemic, including the nature of the disease, its transmission, and preventive behaviors.
 - g. The Ministry of Health will provide the public with public health information about healthy food preparation, sanitation and hygiene, good nutritional practices, and strategies for substituting alternative foods for temporarily unavailable foods.
 - h. The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry will provide training for its staff and for poultry farmers in preparation for an AI pandemic.
 - i. The Ministry of Education will provide instruction to teachers and school children in how to avoid any food-related AI transmission risks and how to deal with shortages. A priority will be to encourage families to increase their own production of healthy food products in home gardens. School children will serve as a communications conduit of this information to parents at home.

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
1	Meat from infected chickens has been sold.	To stop the sale of infected poultry. To reassure people who consumed chicken.	The likelihood of transmission of avian influenza via meat is low, but sale and consumption should not continue during outbreak. People who consumed chicken should be okay if the meat was well cooked. See a doctor if you experience subsequent flu symptoms.	Producers and distributors of chicken, general population, food consumers	4, 6	Risk communication	Ministry of Health What about Ministry of Commerce?
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
1	Chief Environmental Health	Information Officer	News conference, posters in markets	Immediately after discovering possibly contaminated food	Posters	Mini-survey of knowledge and practices concerning use of food exposed to AI	

Section 2: Food Sector	Pandemic Situation	s and Communication	s Responses

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
2	Local and imported food from infected areas in markets causing concern among consumers and retailers.	To inform consumers and retailers about food-related transmission risks.	The likelihood of transmission of avian influenza via food is low, but retailers and consumers should exercise special caution. Food that has been in proximity to infected animals or people should not be consumed. All food should be cleaned and thoroughly cooked.	Food providers, retailers, restaurants, general population, food consumers	3, 4, 6	Risk communication	Ministry of Agriculture This action is already happening

ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING
2	CVO	Information Officer	Posters in markets, public places, health facilities	When news and information about Phase 4 infections is circulating	Posters	Mini-survey of consumer perception of safety of food supply

Section 2: Food Sector Pandemic Situations and Communications Responses

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
3	Hoarding of food by consumers, causing shortages when disease reduces food distribution by producers, transporters, and retailers.	To stop excessive panic buying. To encourage reasonable increases in family food inventories.	Excessive panic buying and hoarding of food by some can cause severe shortages for others. Buy an adequate, but reasonable, emergency stock for your family, not too much.	General population	6	Crisis communication	Ministry of Economy and/or Ministry of Transport and/or supermarket owners
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
3	Permanent Secretary and major supermarket owners	Ministry of Economy and Ministry of Transport Information Officers and supermarket owners	Radio spots, news stories, posters in markets	When markets report stock-outs, panic buying, and hoarding	Posters Daily radio spots	Mini-survey of home food inventories	


Section 2: Food Sector Pandemic Situations and Communications Responses

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
4	Collapse of food distribution.	To encourage people to extend existing supplies by cutting back on consumption. To reassure the public that emergency food will be available to prevent starvation.	Food inventories have been exhausted. Consumers should reduce consumption to a minimum to extend what they have on hand. Emergency food is being sought and will be provided as soon as it is available	General population	6	Crisis communication	Ministry of Economy and/or Ministry of Transport and/or supermarket owners

ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING
4	Minister of Transport and Minister of Economy	Prime Minister or Director of NEMO	Television and radio emergency announcements	Immediately after detecting major shortages, and after decisions to restrict food distribution	Radio and television news bulletins and interviews on talk shows	Mini-survey of food availability and nutritional status of families

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
5	Inadequate inventory of food in the country to survive an extended pandemic.	To encourage food self-sufficiency and home food production.	Home food gardens save money, provide safe food, and protect your family in the event of a food emergency.	General population	4	Behavior change communication	Ministry of Education Ministry of Agriculture
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
5	Ministry of Agriculture Field Officers	Permanent Secretary	Posters, television and radio spots and interviews, school lessons on gardening	As soon as possible	1000 posters	Mini-survey of home gardens	

Section 3: Food Sector Case Study Flow Chart



National Influenza Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan



G. Livelihood Sector Standard Operating Procedures: Avian and Pandemic Influenza Communication in Saint Lucia

LEAD AGENCY: [

Ministry of Trade, Industry, Commerce, Consumer Affairs and Investment

Introduction

The impact of an avian influenza (AI) outbreak on "livelihood" encompasses the impact on employers, employees, and workplaces. In an outbreak, workplaces can quickly become focal points of disease transmission among employees, who will then transmit the disease back to family members. However, workplaces are also important centers for communicating critical information. Both formal internal communication channels and informal networks operate quickly and efficiently in many workplaces. Workplace communication is not centrally controlled except in the government. Companies in Saint Lucia differ in communications mechanisms (e.g., staff meetings and notices on bulletin boards) and corporate cultures. The Chamber of Commerce, unions, and professional associations are umbrella organizations that reach some, but not all, companies and employees. For this reason, efforts to communicate with employers and employees through institutional channels may not reach everyone, and backup communication of urgent messages through the mass media may be required.

How to Use the Livelihood Sector AI Strategy

This document summarizes avian and pandemic flu communications requirements in Saint Lucia's livelihood sector. The document contains three sections:

1. Livelihood Sector Standard Operating Procedures (Page 61)

Section 1 explains how the livelihood sector will prepare for and respond to an outbreak of avian influenza or pandemic flu in Saint Lucia. It provides operational guidelines for the following:

- The *functions* that communication will perform in an outbreak
- The *audiences* to whom communication will be directed
- The *decision-makers and spokespersons* who will manage and implement communication
- Communications channels
- The *resources* that will be required for preparation and response
- The *roles and responsibilities* of individuals and organizations in the event of an outbreak
- 2. Pandemic Situations and Communications Responses (Page 62)

An outbreak can present multiple communications challenges to the livelihood sector in Saint Lucia. Section 2 presents some specific situations that could occur, along with detailed guidance on how to prepare for or respond to them with effective communication. As Saint Lucia's livelihood sector periodically reviews, updates, and practices the Communications Strategy, new situations should be added to Section 2. For each situation, Section 2 identifies:

- The *objective* that communication should accomplish
- The specific *audience* affected by the situation
- The pandemic *phase* in which the situation could arise
- The *communications approach* (risk, crisis, or behavior change communication)



- The *institution* responsible for communication
- The *individual* responsible for managing, overseeing, and approving communications
- The *spokesperson* who actually communicates with the public or the media
- The *communications channels* that will be used
- The *timing* of messages
- The *resources* required for communications interventions
- How communication will be *monitored* for effectiveness
- 3. Case Study Flow Chart (Page 64)

Planning for emergencies requires anticipating different contingencies. Flow charts can be useful tools for planning and implementing communications interventions when different possible events need to be anticipated. Section 3 presents a flow chart illustrating how the livelihood sector in Saint Lucia would work its way through one set of circumstances associated with an AI outbreak. Making flow charts such as the one in Section 3 assures that a communication intervention will be the best possible response in a fast-changing and unfamiliar environment.

Section 1: Livelihood Sector Standard Operating Procedures

- 1. Communications Functions
 - a. Phase 4
 - i. Inform employers and employees about AI and the implications of different outbreak scenarios for workplace issues.
 - ii. Identify conditions in workplaces that will facilitate transmission, and encourage changes in the workplace environment to reduce risks.
 - iii. Encourage employers to develop and practice AI plans for their workplaces, including enhanced sanitation and emergency closing.
 - iv. Teach personal protection behaviors to employees and employers, including social distancing.
 - b. Phase 6
 - i. Inform employers and employees about the outbreak and the dangers of transmission in workplaces.
 - ii. Encourage nonessential workplaces to close voluntarily and workers to stay home to reduce transmission.
 - iii. Advise employers and employees of workplaces closures if such closures are mandated by the Government of Saint Lucia.
- 2. Audiences
 - a. The internal audience includes government employers and employees.
 - b. The external audience includes private sector employers and employees.
- 3. Communications Decision-Makers and Spokespersons
 - a. Government officials who will determine the timing, content, and distribution of communications during a pandemic include the Prime Minister and Ministers of Labour, Industry, and Commerce. Private sector decision-makers include company executives and representatives of umbrella organizations, such as the Chamber of Commerce, union leaders, and professional associations.



- b. Spokespersons will include the above decision-makers as well as the Director of the National Emergency Management Organisation (NEMO), depending on the circumstances.
- 4. Channels
 - a. Internal memos and meetings will be used for risk communication as an outbreak is developing.
 - b. In large workplaces, a "cascade" model will be used to disseminate information down the chain of command from executives to managers to supervisors to employees. Employers will be encouraged to communicate frequently with employees and to listen to their concerns about possible transmission in the workplace.
 - c. Signs and posters prominently displayed in workplaces may also be used.
 - d. If the emergency reaches the point at which workplaces must close, communications with workers will use the national mass media.
- 5. Resources
 - a. Prior to and during a pandemic, the Ministry of Health will distribute printed materials about avian influenza for display in workplaces throughout the country.
 - b. Prior to and during a pandemic, the Ministry of Agriculture will distribute printed materials about avian influenza for display at farms and agri business throughout the country.
 - c. Mass media products and access, if needed, will be provided by the Government Information Service (GIS).
 - d. Private employers will use internal emergency resources as necessary.
- 6. Roles and Responsibilities
 - a. Workplace communications responses will follow procedures established in the Government of Saint Lucia Avian Influenza Preparedness Plan.
 - b. NEMO will coordinate the flow of information between the government and private employees, ensuring consistency, accuracy, and timeliness.
 - c. The Ministers of Labour, Industry, and Commerce will normally be the final approving authority for the content and timing of communications concerning the workforce. Responsibility is shared with company owners and executives and umbrella organizations, such as the Chamber of Commerce, unions, and professional associations. Each organization will designate its own spokespersons.
 - d. Mass media support, if needed, will be provided by the GIS.
 - e. Employers have special responsibility for educating employees about workplace risk factors and preventive practices. Employers should have procedures in place, and these procedures should be explained to employees in anticipation of possible outbreaks.
 - f. Employers should report all possible cases of infection to the Ministry of Health and then enforce "social distancing" procedures and other preventive behaviors to protect other workers.


ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
1	Employers have limited information and have made insufficient preparations for an influenza pandemic (anytime prior to or during outbreak).	To create awareness and understanding of avian influenza and workplace factors that affect transmission.	The nature of the disease, transmission, dangers, and precautionary measures. How the workplace environment affects transmission.	Employers What about Trade Unions, Ministry for the Public Service?	4, 6	Risk communication	Ministry of Economy, Chamber of Commerce, professional associations, Ministry of Health Employers Federation
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
1	Minister of Economy	Minister of Health	Posters in workplaces, public meetings for employers, letter and a pamphlet to employers	As soon as possible	Meeting venues, printed materials, AI 10-Minute Assessment	Unstructured interviews with selected employers	

Section 2: Livelihood Sector Pandemic Situations and Communications Responses

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
2	Employees have limited information and have made insufficient preparations for a possible influenza pandemic .	To create awareness and understanding of avian influenza.	The nature of the disease, transmission, dangers, and precautionary measures.	Employees	4	Risk communication	Company or office
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
2	Chief Executive Officer or office chief	Workplace supervisor	Informational flyer, workplace staff meetings	As soon as possible	Meeting venues, printed materials	Mini-survey of employees	

ID	SITUATION	OBJECTIVE	MESSAGE	AUDIENCE	PHASE	APPROACH	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION
3	Government and Chamber of Commerce collaboratively decide to close both private and public sector due to pandemic alert.	To inform individuals of the need to exercise all necessary precautions to avoid the further spread of avian influenza.	All government offices and private sector businesses are closing to protect workers and contain the epidemic. All employees should not go to work until further notice.	All public and private sector employers and employees	6	Crisis communication	Ministry of Economy in consultation with the National Emergency Management Organisation and Chamber of Commerce Ministry of Economy? I don't understand.
ID	RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	SPOKESPERSON	CHANNELS	TIMING	RESOURCES	MONITORING	
3	Prime Minister, National Emergency Management Advisory Committee	Prime Minister	Mass media	When National Avian Influenza Crisis Committee determines that workplaces should close	Media time, National Shutdown Procedure	Mini-survey of employees	

Section 2: Livelihood Sector Pandemic Situations and Communications Responses



Section 3: Livelihood Sector Case Study Flow Chart

National Influenza Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan



III. PLAN FOR TESTING, VALIDATING, AND UPDATING THE STRATEGY

A. Introduction

To determine the validity of the Strategy and SOPs, the Avian Influenza Communications Committee will indicate in their review of the plan, and in future outbreak and pandemic incident debriefings:

- The percentage increase in knowledge among health workers and the public regarding
 - the identification of symptoms and of behaviors that are conducive to limiting the spread of the virus strain
 - the purpose of and the roles of the government and public and private sectors for surveillance, quarantine, isolation, and/or social distancing
 - o the immediacy, accuracy, and credibility of pandemic preparedness and response messages
- Whether the objectives of the Strategy were met
- Whether the changes achieved in communications response readiness were a direct result of the Strategy
- What went well and why, and what could have gone better and why
- How the Strategy can be improved
- Lessons learned and with whom they should be shared

B. Recommendations to Ensure Full Implementation of the Plan

The NEMO Secretariat, in cooperation and with support of the rest of the Avian and Pandemic Communications Committee, will take the responsibility to:

- Set targets, define indicators, and benchmark to assess progress
- Test and revise the Strategy regularly to keep it dynamic and ensure that it is widely known
- Define who is responsible for the supervision of progress
- Test the Strategy and SOPs
- Revise the Strategy based on experience with or without new outbreaks (e.g., dengue or SARS)

C. Monitoring and Evaluation Guidance

When communication is a matter of life or death, it is especially critical to know if messages are getting through, if they are being understood, and if they are being acted on. To know what information is needed by the public about an Influenza outbreak, GOSL communicators will measure audiences' knowledge about Influenza, the outbreak, and what to do to protect themselves and others. Once communications activities begin, communicators must know who is receiving their messages, if the messages are considered credible, and if they are producing the desired behavioral responses. This feedback is required so that communicators can continuously adapt and change their tactics for immediate and universal impact.

The GOSL partners will make use of economical "rapid appraisal" monitoring tools. Rapid appraisal monitoring has important features that make it suited for pandemic communication, including: (1) low or no cost, (2) same-day or next-day results, (3) no professional interviewers or analysts needed, and (4) direct and immediate responsiveness to communicators' needs. A number of rapid appraisal tools will be used to monitor pandemic communication in Saint Lucia, including:

- Mini-surveys with short questionnaires applied to small numbers of respondents
- Unstructured interviews with experts, key informants, and decision-makers
- Statistics and reports from service providers



- Direct observation of behaviors
- Content analysis of media coverage

D. Future Needs for Training, Technical Assistance, and Budget Analysis

The table below outlines recommendations for testing, validating, and updating the Communications Strategy and additional training and technical assistance from which Saint Lucia pandemic responders would benefit.

Sector or Elements to Test or Validate	Type of Activity, Test, Exercise, or Training	Purpose	Person, Agency, or Organization Responsible	Date	Budget
Effectiveness of Strategy and SOPs in achieving goals	Survey and analysis	To test and set baseline for knowledge of the public and health workers	Bureau of Health Education		
Health providers	Pandemic communications training	To verify understanding of Communications Strategy, SOPs, and roles	Principal Information Officer		
Cross-functional understanding of Communications Strategy and roles	Table-top drill involving animal- to- human, then human-to- human escalating pandemic	Initial test of level of knowledge and understanding of each organization's communications roles	NEMO Secretariat		
Cross-functional response communications, all functions, media involvement	Full-scale drill involving an AI outbreak on a cruise ship or ferry	To test the Government of Saint Lucia National Influenza Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan and response mechanisms, the Communications Strategy, and SOPs; focus on Ministry of Tourism, Board of Tourism, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Security, and so forth.	Designated Authority for the International Ship and Port Security		
Interagency communications	Meetings of the National Committee	To sustain preparedness activities.	ALL Members of the NIPPP Committee	On going	
Regional communications	Regional Can be PAHO, CAREC, CDERA, OECS, CARICOM, ACS – what are we looking for here?				
Media	Briefing on Government of Saint Lucia National Influenza Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan	To pre-educate media on the Government of Saint Lucia National Influenza Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan, Communications Strategy, and agencies' roles	ALL Members of the NIPPP Committee	On going	
Communicators for NEMO and Sectors; Ministry technical spokespersons	Spokesperson training	Ensure that all designated spokespersons and their technical advisors understand how to manage media in a crisis and how to deliver key messages in a pandemic	NEMO Secretariat		

Annex B.3: Saint Lucia Channels of Information: Media, Cable, Web, Phone

Introduction

The population of nearly 200,000 people living in Saint Lucia may choose to gather information from a relatively large number of television, cable and radio stations, in addition to multiple newspapers and internet sources. Because audiences are splintered, the National Emergency Management Office will continue pursuing a telephone text message agreement with Cable and Wireless and other providers so that when a pandemic or other national emergency strikes, the majority of the population can be reached quickly about how to best protect their safety and the safety of others.

While several members of the National Avian Influenza Communications Planning Committee in Saint Lucia have identified challenges in convincing media to attend meetings, NEMO and several of the ministries have well working relationships with the press. This is evident in the media's consistent coverage of disasters and health emergencies that threaten public safety and the media's pro-active outreach to NEMO when the reporters, producers and editors need verification of facts for a story, or have a news hole to fill.

A central and legitimate concern exists throughout the Committee, however, regarding accuracy of scientific and technical information reported by the press. Because accuracy and timeliness is critical to public safety during an avian or other influenza pandemic, the Committee will include media in future Pandemic Communications Strategy briefings, and involve them to some degree in drills or other tests of the Operational Plan.

Television stations are not required to run government programming or to run emergency broadcasting tests, however the public would benefit by the establishment of an emergency broadcasting system (EMS) whereby all media in Saint Lucia run a very brief standardized daily test where emergency updates would be inserted if/when necessary. Such systems can be run voluntarily and/or required for stations to renew their licenses.

Updates to the plan during periodic review and revision will be shared with key media members to assure that media new to their positions know which institutions and ministries to contact first for information related to avian and pandemic flu. Many journalists and reporters are hired upon completion of school, and choose to move to other careers within a few years. This creates a need for constant education and updating of the press concerning matters of public safety.

Newspapers

The two major competitors in Saint Lucia's newspaper business are *The Saint Lucia Star* and *The Voice of Saint Lucia*. Both papers publish on Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday of each week. *The Mirror* is a weekly publication that prints each Friday. *The Crusader* prints every Saturday. All newspapers are tabloid size, and the government does not have an agreement with any of them; however, the government purchases paid ads for announcing bids in the newspapers. Deadlines for submissions are Monday 12:00 noon, Wednesday 12:00 noon and Friday 12:00 noon for the *The Voice* and *The Star* newspapers, Thursday 12:00 noon for *The Mirror* and Friday 12:00 noon for *The Crusader*.

Annex B.3: Saint Lucia Channels of Information: Media, Cable, Web, Phone

<u>Radio</u>

All radio stations in Saint Lucia are FM Band.

Radio Saint Lucia --Full scale programming with news, documentaries, talk shows and an MOR (middle of the road/general) music format. Age group of listeners varies throughout the day. News bulletins at 1800 (6:00 pm.) daily, followed by a Creole news cast through 2000 (8:00 p.m.). Note: Cyprian Yarde of the AI Communications Planning Committee and Ministry of Health, Bureau of Health Education announces the Creole news broadcast when the regular news caster is on vacation.

Radio 100 "Helen FM" -- Same type of programming as Radio Saint Lucia, simulcast on 100.1 frequency in the North, and 103.5 in the South.

Hot FM -- Full scale programming like those above, but more focused on entertainment. Has some Creole programming in the morning and evening. More music broadcasted on this station than the two above. Also airs MOR music format.

Radio Caribbean International (RCI) – Full scale programming, includes news casts.

Joy FM -- Religious format

Praize FM -- Religious format

Rizzen FM -- Religious format

Rhythm FM – Entertainment and talk show format. Music targeted at all generations.

The Wave - Full scale programming.

Reason 102.5 FM (formerly Praise FM) -- Religious format.

Private Radio Networks include that of NEMO (contact Dawn French), volunteer radio networks and radio operations at Rodney Bay Marina for boater information.

Television

Helen Television System (HTS) – Programming consists of satellite relays of movies, sitcoms, reality shows. Local news is at 1900 (7:00 pm) Monday to Saturday. Number two for audience (ages 35-50). Named Helen Television because Saint Lucia used to be called "Helen of the West"

Daher Broadcasting Service – At the time the Plan was written, it was number one with audiences for the 1900 (7:00) pm news Monday to Saturday (audience ages 18-30). Principle owner is Mr. Paul Daher.

Think Caribbean Television (TCT) -- Programming is mostly satellite relay (FOX news is a staple). African movie every day at 5:30 pm. Local news times vary.

Choice Television -- Mostly satellite relay content like the other two main TV stations: sitcoms, movies, shows, music videos. Very little local content (there is a music show called Da Vibe aimed at teenagers and young adults; and Escapades, a show which highlights off-the-beaten-track areas of Saint Lucia locals can explore).

Annex B.3: Saint Lucia Channels of Information: Media, Cable, Web, Phone

The Visitor Channel - Privately owned and everyone can receive it

National Television Network (NTN) – Government owned

Cable Providers

Cable and Wireless -- Bundles with phone and internet services. Market leader in terms of cable service, has island-wide coverage and have provided cable services the longest. They own the infrastructure/hardware, phone poles etc.

Spectra Cable -- Digital

Cox Cable – Limited range services the Castries City and environs.

Karibcable - Currently laying down their cable. They will also bundle with phone service.

Internet Providers

Most internet services are now broadband. Cable and Wireless is the leader

Karibcable also provides service but is still building infrastructure.

Cell Phone Services

Inter-island cell phone service is generally good throughout the island. Many people use text messaging extensively. Text messages have been used for public safety information, and to do so you need to go to make a request of the service provider. Text announcements are also used for public events like jazz festivals, etc.

Cable and Wireless – The island's leading cell service provider. Many people still use land lines owned by Cable and Wireless, as Cable and Wireless owns most of the telephone infrastructure on Saint Lucia.

Digicel -- Offers some land line services, but more like a fixed cell phone service. Digicell does not run text advertisements.

Telephone Conferences

Works well, but not excellent for international conference calls. A foreign dial-in service is used with a pass-code and once all participants have the number and pass-code it should work. Participants should be in a quiet environment, as background noise tends to filter a lot louder than anything else. For example, trying to do this while in a crowded emergency operations center or restaurant setting is disruptive to other callers and diminishes clarity of communication. Cable & Wireless is currently the telecoms provider with the facilities to establish conference calling. The other phone company in the market, Digicel, is a mobile service provider.

Sources: Cyprian Yarde and Kerby Allain

Annex C.1: List of Resources, Equipment, Technology, and Staff Needed for Mass Communications Effort

This list may be adjusted to meet local needs and practices. Inventory should be taken twice a year to assure all printed materials, equipment, contact lists and other resources are available and up to date.

Standard Operating Procedure (SOPs)—SOPs for communications activities required during a developing and full-scale pandemic. The SOPs include written and agreed-upon functions, locations, and roles of staff; a communications organizational chart; designated equipment, supplies, and other resources allocated for the communications function; patterns of internal and external information flow; information release approval authorities and timelines; thresholds and guidelines for activation of the Communications Operational Plan and staff; contact lists; and pre-agreements with vendors and other operating communications entities during a crisis.

List of staff requirements—Include numbers and skills required for all communications roles at each work site to work shifts 24 hours, seven days per week, for a minimum of 10 days. Work sites might include the national emergency management/coordination facility, sites where media naturally gather to film the incident and interview officials and people affected by the incident, individual ministry communications offices receiving media inquiries. Some of the skills required for a smooth communications operation will likely include spokespersons, writers, media hotline staff, media and web/blog monitors, administrative support staff, staff to post web/internet updates and a technology specialist to trouble shoot and repair online, computer and equipment malfunctions.

Designated area or a mobile communications unit—The mobile unit should be equipped with satellite capacity, radio capacity, and web capacity.

"Go Kits" for field communicators and press officers—Go Kits should include clothing and/or vest to ID which organization the communicator represents, vehicle ID to help gain access to restricted sites when necessary, flashlight and transistor radio with extra batteries, protective gear like work gloves and mask if needed, signage/posters or poster paper used for signs to help community members know what to do and what services are available, large waterproof marker pens, heavy duty tape, cell phone with two way radio capacity, current media contact list and Saint Lucia emergency communicators list, pad of paper for notes, ballpoint pens, business card with communicator's mobile phone number and other contact information for follow up questions from media.

Telecommunications, text messaging, and email capacity—It is important to indicate the number and type of phones available and needed, with pre-arranged contracts. Palm computing devices with text capacity for accessing email for rapidly changing information are needed by communications staff moving rapidly between work locations. Two-way radio capacity on phones—in case cells go down—is a good backup measure. Pre-arrange phone jacks and extensions for landlines that can be turned on in an emergency. Resources are needed to meet the media needs of media in Saint Lucia as well as international media who will be calling for updates, interviews, and accurate information. General intake of calls can normally be handled by operators with very little media relations experience, if they have an on-site supervisor with media expertise who can triage calls and categorize their level of importance and immediacy to get them to the right spokesperson within the timeframe necessary.

Web Site—To be developed and managed by the GIS Information Officer, with possible access by designated health, agriculture, and disaster personnel for postings.

Links between computer databases—The Ministry of Health in Saint Lucia is currently part of the FINMAM computer network, which could be used to link the office of the Information Officer to Epidemiology, thus enhancing the information communication system. Such links will provide the capacity for instant communication, mass e-mailing, and other features.

Annex C.1: List of Resources, Equipment, Technology, and Staff Needed for Mass Communications Effort

Command Center Information unit supplies and staff—Predetermined items to deploy to the field might include loudspeakers, trash bags, posters and blank poster paper, tape, pens, and if possible a portable wireless computer and printer.

ID for staff, supplies and vehicles—See "Go Kit" above.

Office supplies—For first 10 days of operation, to include working computers, printers, and photocopiers. Extra copying and printing toner and paper should be reserved for emergency.

Televisions, radio, newspapers, internet access—For monitoring real time news. Staff will need to monitor what is being reported, and flag any false information or rumors that need correcting by the communications team.

List of procedures for authorizers and their deputies to quickly approve press announcements— Approvals should be secured within 15 minutes in a crisis situation, which may require the key authorizing individual to appoint a deputy for approvals when s/he is not available.

Space for press conferences/briefings—Ensure there is space with room for media equipment, wireless internet connectivity, microphones, mult box, and/or a media teleconferencing system. Only use press conferences/briefings when there is news to tell that needs more emphasis or technical clarification than a press release can convey, or when a hostile news atmosphere requires a trusted official to address media in person. Media usually prefer to receive information their rough written press releases or bulletins because of restraints on their time. Usually an emergency operations coordination organization will include other partners in a press briefing if they are needed to explain details; such as Ministry of Agriculture to explain scientific details if birds infected; Health Ministry to answer questions related to human infection; and partner volunteer agencies if they are very involved in helping families cope physically or mentally.

Note: Refreshments for media go a long way in an emergency, and if briefings can be held at a time convenient to their deadlines and on-air schedule, the turnout of media at briefings will be better.

Mobile phone charging stations and Internet Hot Spots (Wi-Fi)—Ensure these are available for reporters and the communications team.

Supply of medical needs—Place these where journalists gather and in designated rooms for quarantine and isolation.

Pre-approved fact sheets—Include technical and scientific information simplified for general audiences and media to help fill news hours between press briefings and updates so that media do not need to scramble for information from unofficial sources.

Pre-written message templates—Include space to insert details specific to the incident. Prepare these for the first media message, and for predictable benchmarks in the emergency operation and final reporting.

Template fliers/bulletins—For people (media/tourists) disembarking planes and ships and for hotel guests. Much of the same information can be used for the public, for example, how to protect yourself and others from exposure.

Video/DVD of drills or former responses—Provide to media who are not allowed in to the restricted zone, to demonstrate visually how the processes work. Show them pre-shot video of the testing lab, for example. This helps them fill news with credible information and visuals, and helps the public understand the process as public officials lead the way to find answers and solutions to regaining normalcy in the community.

Annex C.1: List of Resources, Equipment, Technology, and Staff Needed for Mass Communications Effort

Pre-arranged agreements with telephone companies, postal service, and other channels of information–For blast text messaging, notices to personal mail boxes, expanding phone and fax capacity, etc.

Designated area for communicators—For production of materials, monitoring media, etc.

Updated media list—Includes phone numbers to assignment editors and desks, beat reporters, and email addresses.

Updated emergency communicator list—Includes mobile, home, and office phone numbers, and email addresses.

Annex E: Bibliography

The Role of a Risk and Crisis Communicator

The job of a crisis communicator is to articulate information your audience will understand. The more complex that information, the harder you will have to work to convey it clearly.

- Know yourself and your message; plan your key messages ahead of time (no more than 3).
- Use pre-interview time to do your homework: ask the requesting reporter what the topic of his/her story is, the format, if there are other guests (who?), and what questions s/he will need answered, so you can locate the facts ahead of time—research online and talk to colleagues to become aware of the interests and interview style of the reporter.
- There is no such thing as "Off the Record": not when the interviewer pauses and you feel like adding unnecessary detail to your response, not when you are escorting the reporter to the door after the interview is completed, and not in social settings unrelated to work.
- Identify yourself clearly by name, title, and organization; spell your name for the reporter; in most circumstances wear a shirt, jacket, or pin with the logo of your organization visible on camera; dress for the setting—if you are in a disaster shelter, don't wear expensive clothing and jewelry; if you are doing field work, dress as you would for field work.

Answering Questions

- Each key message may be written as a statement, then give evidence that backs up the statement, then summarize, re-phrasing the original statement. Each key message should be summarized within approximately 11 to 17 words (a "sound bite") this is because editors cut unnecessary information and use what they wish to. If you give less information but are right on target with what you wish to convey, it is likely your intended messages will be used.
- During an interview, don't fill the empty air space at the end of the statement when the reporter continues to hold the microphone up—stop speaking at the end of your summary statement.
- Track your key messages by monitoring media reports or hiring a vendor to do so.
- Listen hard to the questions, and don't rush into an answer, especially for a taped or print interview. You can take your time to carefully consider the question and respond by bridging into your key message.
- When addressed by or about critics, practice self-management, be professional, and strive to personify the mission of your organization in your response.
- Tell the truth; speak and act with integrity.
- Create constructive dialogue—don't spin, or you will lose credibility with your audience.
- Anticipate questions and be prepared.

Managing Hostile Situations

- Acknowledge the environment of hostility.
- Practice self-control.

- Be prepared.
- Be empathic and caring.
- Monitor your responses.
- Understand the motives behind the hostility.
- Be proactive when a situation arises, so you are not caught having to react to a negative story or allegation.
- Maintain control over volatile exchanges; do not become defensive.
- Avoid putting people who are nervous, shy, arrogant, or aggressive in interview situations.
- Keep your audience in the loop via an up-to-date web site.
- Control the coverage, and prioritize your messages.